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INTRODUCTION
The Treasury's "check-the-box regulations" govern the most basic of all
corporate tax issues-namely, which entities are subject to the corporate tax.
These fundamental regulations are practical, sensible, and (some would argue)
indispensable.I However, they are also unlawful.
The check-the-box regulations govern the classification of business entities
as corporations or partnerships for federal tax purposes. 2 In general, the
earnings of an entity classified as a corporation are subject to two layers of tax:
an entity-level tax-the corporate income tax-on the corporation's earnings;
and an owner-level tax-the individual income tax-on distributions of
earnings to the corporation's owners.3 Business entities not classified as
corporations for tax purposes are generally classified as partnerships. 4
Earnings of partnerships are subject to only a single level of tax at the owner
level.5 Thus, the tax classification of an entity as either a corporation or a
partnership is the most basic of all corporate tax issues because it determines
whether or not the entity is subject to the corporate income tax.
Section 7701(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") provides that
"[t]he term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-stock companies, and
1 See 1 WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS
3.08, at 3-102 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2002) (noting that the regulations "have evoked
virtually universal approbation and support from private practitioners and taxpayers").
2 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in 2003).
3 See 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1.01-1.03, at 1-3 to 1-11 (7th ed. 2000 & Supp.
2002) (describing in general how corporate earnings are taxed). In some cases, corporations
are not subject to the double tax regime while in other cases, corporations are subject to
unique taxing regimes. See id. 1.06, at 1-25 to 1-29 (describing these special regimes).
' See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (2000) (defining partnership as any business entity that is not
otherwise determined to be a corporation, trust, or estate).
' See generally I MCKEE ET AL., supra note 1, 1.01[1] (describing the taxation of
income earned by partnerships).
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insurance companies." 6 The federal tax law definition of "corporation" thus
includes not only state law corporations but, more broadly, "associations." As
a result, associations are taxable as corporations. The language in § 7701(a)(3)
(and its predecessor statutes) has remained unchanged for over eighty-five
years. 7
The question of which entities are included in the term "association" has
confounded courts from the term's first appearance in the Code. 8 The United
States Supreme Court attempted to clear the confusion in the 1935 case
Morrissey v. Commissioner,9 interpreting the term to mean any unincorporated
entity that resembles a state law corporation. In determining whether an entity
resembles a corporation, the Morrissey Court identified four relevant corporate
factors: limited liability for owners, free transferability of ownership interests,
perpetual existence of the entity, and a centralized management structure.
10
Unfortunately, Morrissey did not end the confusion. Even after the U.S.
Treasury promulgated regulations that applied Morrissey's corporate
resemblance test in a relatively mechanical fashion, the test remained
problematic. As a result, in 1996, the Treasury proposed the check-the-box
regulations, defining the term "association" to mean any unincorporated
business entity that elects to be taxed as a corporation. At the time, several
commentators expressed concern that the regulations were invalid under the
well-known Chevron doctrine."' In particular, they argued that by giving the
term "association" an elective definition, the regulations were incompatible
with the statutory language, which suggested that Congress intended the term
to have substantive meaning. The issue of whether the regulations satisfied the
Chevron standard was the subject of significant debate and was even analyzed
by the Joint Committee on Taxation.' 2 Notwithstanding these concerns, the
Treasury soon promulgated the regulations in final form, apparently
concluding that the regulations were valid under Chevron.
In this article, I argue that the check-the-box regulations are invalid because
the Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey forecloses any re-interpretation of
the term "association" by the Treasury. Accordingly, the focus on Chevron in
6 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (emphasis added).
7 Compare Revenue Act of 1918 § 1 (defining corporation as including "associations,
joint-stock companies, and insurance companies"), with I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (same).
8 See, e.g., Coleman-Gilbert Assoc. v. Comm'r, 76 F.2d 191, 193 (1st Cir. 1935)
(describing the confusion surrounding the definition of the term "association").
9 296 U.S. 344, 357-58 (1935).
'o Id. at 359.
" In very general terms, the Chevron doctrine requires that courts defer to any
reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute. For a full discussion of Chevron,
see infra Part I.
12 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105th CONG., REVIEW OF SELECTED ENTITY
CLASSIFICATION AND PARTNERSHIP TAX ISSUES 13-17 (Joint Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter
JCT REPORT].
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the discussion of the validity of the regulations has been misplaced because, in
assessing the validity of the regulations, one should never even reach the
Chevron issue.
This conclusion is based on a trilogy of Supreme Court opinions holding
that when the Court interprets a statutory term, that interpretation is binding on
the executive branch and may be altered only by an act of Congress or a
subsequent opinion of the Court.' 3 Therefore, these cases hold that, at least as
far as the executive branch is concerned, a judicial interpretation of a statute is
effectively incorporated into the underlying statute. Accordingly, because the
check-the-box regulations' definition of association (i.e., any unincorporated
entity that elects to be taxed as a corporation) is wholly inconsistent with the
Morrissey definition (i.e., any unincorporated entity which resembles a
corporation), the check-the-box regulations are invalid. To be clear, this article
does not dispute the prevailing opinion that the regulations represent good tax
policy; 14 rather, it argues that the Treasury never had the authority to
implement this policy in the first place.
After explaining why the check-the-box regulations are invalid, this article
addresses several counter-arguments that, if successful, would save the
regulations from invalidity. Ultimately, this article concludes that these
counter-arguments are not fully persuasive.
Although this article focuses on only one specific regulatory action, the
underlying issue has broad significance. It has been increasingly common for
the Treasury to attempt to "fix" a Supreme Court interpretation that, for
various reasons, the Treasury finds problematic. When faced with such a
problematic interpretation, tax administrators have three choices: (1) propose
13 See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 294-96 (1996) (holding that a United States
Sentencing Commission interpretation was invalid because it was inconsistent with the
Court's prior interpretation); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (holding that a
National Labor Relations Board interpretation was invalid because it was inconsistent with
the Court's prior interpretations); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S.
116, 134-35 (1990) (holding that an Interstate Commerce Commission interpretation was
invalid because it was inconsistent with the Court's prior interpretation).
14 See, e.g., 1 McKEE ET AL., supra note 1, 3.08, at 3-102 (praising the policy behind
the regulations). In the international arena, however, the regulations have given rise to some
unfortunate consequences. The regulations have facilitated the use of hybrid entities, which
are treated as flow-through entities for U.S. federal tax purposes and corporations for
foreign tax purposes or vice versa. For discussions of the potential abuse of hybrids that has
been facilitated by the issuance of the check-the-box regulations and the Treasury's
responses thereto, see William L. Bricker, Jr. et al., Use of Hybrids in International Tax
Planning: Past, Present and Future, 13 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 79 (1998); Thomas
R. May, Warning: Hybrid Entities-Proceed With Caution, 86 TAX NOTES 533, 533-34
(Jan. 24, 2000), available at LEXIS 86 TN 533. The hybrid problem was not created by the
regulations; however, the regulations did "make international tax-planning strategies that
may not have been practical (due to the cost of implementation, probability of success, etc.)
before their issuance both practical and attractive after their issuance." Id. at 533.
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legislation to Congress to fix the problem, (2) promulgate regulations that fix
the problem in a taxpayer-adverse manner, or (3) promulgate regulations that
fix the problem in a taxpayer-friendly manner. This article will demonstrate
that option number (1) (go to Congress) is the only valid solution. The
Treasury, however, has recently shown a tendency to choose option number (3)
(fix the problem in taxpayer-friendly manner). This phenomenon likely results
from the very restrictive standing rules governing taxpayer lawsuits that reduce
or eliminate the likelihood of challenges to these invalid rules.
This article is divided into five parts. Part I lays out the administrative law
landscape, describing the Chevron doctrine and its interaction with judicial
precedent. Part II traces the history of the interpretation of the term
"association" from its inception in the predecessor to § 7701(a)(3) up through
the check-the-box regulations. Part III then applies administrative law
principles to the check-the-box regulations, concluding that they are invalid.
Part III also addresses the colorable arguments that could be made to save the
regulations, but ultimately concludes that these arguments are not persuasive.
Part IV considers how the Treasury could have issued invalid regulations in
such an important and visible area of the law. In this discussion, Part IV
describes the context in which a challenge to the regulations might arise and
the practical consequences of a successful challenge. Finally, Part V argues
that the Treasury has developed a trend of issuing taxpayer-friendly rules that
are, like the check-the-box regulations, invalid because they are inconsistent
with Supreme Court decisions directly on point. Part V also discusses the
implications of this trend.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Chevron Law
Prior to the Supreme Court's seminal 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,15 there was no coherent theory or
doctrine regarding the judicial review of agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutes.' 6 When considering agency interpretations, the level of respect the
Court afforded the agency's view often varied significantly from case to case.' 7
In general, the cases could be split into two vastly different categories.
Sometimes, the Court deferred to any agency interpretation that was reasonable
in light of the statutory scheme.' 8 Under this method, which has been called
'1 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16 See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.1 (4th ed. 2002 &
Supp. 2003) (describing pre-Chevron guidelines for judicial review of agency
interpretations); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE
L.J. 969, 972-75 (1992) (discussing the pre-1984 judicial review guidelines).
17 See Merrill, supra note 16, at 972.
18 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (upholding National
Labor Relations Board's interpretation of the term "employee" in the National Labor
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the deferential model, the Court would not actively interpret the statute at
issue-rather, its "role was limited to determining whether the agency's
interpretation was reasonable." 1 9 In other words, under this model, the Court
would not seek to find the single best interpretation but would merely ensure
that the agency's position was within the universe of rational interpretations
and not arbitrary or capricious. 20 In these instances, the agency, rather than the
judiciary, would have primary interpretive authority. 21
In other cases, the Court would take primary interpretive authority and
independently review the statute in an attempt to find the single best
interpretation. 22 Under this method, known as the independent judgment
model, the Court would actively interpret the statute, rather than merely
determining whether the agency's proffered interpretation was reasonable.2 3
Under the independent judgment model, even though the Court had primary
interpretive authority, the agency's view was not irrelevant. Because of the
agency's familiarity with the statutory scheme and its underlying policies, the
agency's "view of the proper meaning [was] a factor in the court's analysis,
[and was] given whatever persuasive effect it appear[ed] to merit in the
Relations Act as including newsboys, even though newsboys were characterized as
independent contractors for other purposes, because the interpretation had "a reasonable
basis in law"); see also PIERCE, supra note 16, § 3.1, at 139 (observing that, in certain
instances prior to Chevron, the Court would defer to any interpretation promulgated by an
agency so long as the interpretation was reasonable); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
452, 454 (1989) (same). Even though the deferential model was, in general, sporadically
applied by courts, it was consistently applied where Congress made an explicit delegation of
law-making authority to an agency. See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834
(1984); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S.
416, 425 (1977); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 235-37 (1936)
(finding clear congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority to the respective
agencies and applying the deferential model); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional
Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272,
1285 (2002) ("[Chevron] simply expanded the separation-of-powers model that the Supreme
Court had applied since the beginning of the twentieth century to instances in which
Congress explicitly assigned to agencies the power to construe regulatory statutes.").
19 See Rebecca Hammer White, The Stare Decisis "Exception" to the Chevron
Deference Rule, 44 FLA. L. REV. 723, 729 (1992).
20 Farina, supra note 18, at 454.
21 See id. at 453-54.
22 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (independently determining
that the term "employees" in the National Labor Relations Act did not include buyers
despite the National Labor Relations Board's conclusion to the contrary); see also PIERCE,
supra note 16, § 3.1 (describing how, in certain instances prior to Chevron, the Court would
independently interpret a statute in a manner contrary to an agency's reasonable
interpretation); Farina, supra note 18, at 453-54 (same).
23 Farina, supra note 18, at 453-54.
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circumstances." 24 At all times under this model, however, it was the Court that
would decide the statute's single best meaning, even if the Court ultimately
agreed with the agency's position.2 5
Prior to Chevron, it was often impossible to predict in any given case
whether the Court would apply the independent judgment model or the
deferential model.26 Furthermore, it was often difficult to characterize a
decision as employing one or the other type of analysis. 27 The leading
administrative law treatise described the hopelessly muddled state of affairs at
the time: "The Court ... substitutes judgment in some cases and uses the
reasonable test [i.e., the deferential review model] in other cases, without
providing any guide as to what actuates its choices.
28
B. Chevron's Impact- Victory for the Deferential Model?
In Chevron, the Court appeared to adopt conclusively the deferential model,
articulating the precise steps a court should take in reviewing agency
interpretations. When a court is faced with an agency interpretation of an
agency-administered statute, Chevron instructed that the first step is for the
court to determine whether Congress "has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue."'29 Under this step one, a court should look to the words of
the statute and "employ[] ... traditional tools of statutory construction" to
ascertain whether "Congress had an intention on the precise question at
issue."'30 If so, the clear will of Congress as expressed in the statute controls,
notwithstanding a contrary interpretation asserted by the agency.31
Step one is thus consistent with both the independent judgment and
deferential models. If a case is concluded at that step, it means that the court
has determined that the statute has a clear meaning. Under the independent
judgment model, the court would have independently adopted that same
meaning, and under the deferential model, the court would find "unreasonable"
any contrary meaning.
If step one yields the determination that "Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue," Chevron then instructed the Court to
24 Id. at 454.
25 Id. at 453 (explaining that, under the independent judgment model, "the court
exercises its own judgment to determine de novo what the statute means").
26 Id. at 454-55.
27 See Merrill, supra note 16, at 972 (describing pre-Chevron confusion and concluding
that, although there existed cases falling neatly within the independent judgment model or
the deferential model, "in practice, deference existed along a sliding scale, bridging these
outer limits").
28 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 375 (2d ed. 1958).
29 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
30 Id. at 843 n.9.
31 Id. at 842-43.
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move on to step two. 32 In step two, a court "does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an
administrative interpretation. 33 Rather, the court seeks to determine simply
"whether the agency's [position] is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. '34 To determine that an agency position is permissible, "[t]he court
need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly
could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court
would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial
proceeding. 35 Rather, the court's responsibility is to determine whether the
agency's position represents a "reasonable policy choice" in light of the
congressional mandate articulated in the statute.3 6 Thus, under step two, a
court's task is not to determine the single best interpretation of an ambiguous
statute as it would under the independent judgment model; its task is to
determine only whether the agency's position is a reasonable one.3 7
Therefore, although step one is consistent with both the independent
judgment model and the deferential model, the deference shown to any
reasonable interpretation under step two suggests that the deferential model
won the day.38 As discussed below, however, the 2001 Mead decision has now
made clear that the independent judgment model did survive Chevron.3 9
The doctrinal basis for Chevron deference has been the subject of significant
32 Id. at 843.
33 Id. (footnote omitted).
31 Id. (footnote omitted).
35 Id. at 843 n. 11.
36 Id. at 845.
37 The Supreme Court has never made clear how a court is supposed to determine when
an interpretation plausible enough to survive step one is nonetheless unreasonable under
Chevron step two. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1253, 1260 (1997) (arguing that the Court's step two standard is
vague and "seem[s] to verge on internal incoherence"). The leading view appears to be that
step two deals with an agency's decisionmaking process in arriving at an interpretation,
focusing primarily on whether the agency adequately considered the matter at hand as
opposed to making an arbitrary and capricious decision. See Animal Def. Fund v.
Glickman, 204 F.3d 229, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (concluding that step two is designed to
strike down interpretations that, while plausible under the statute, were arbitrary and
capricious); see also PIERCE, supra note 16, § 3.6, at 11 (2003 Supp.) (explaining that, in
applying step two, the Supreme Court has been "evaluating the adequacy of an agency's
reasoning process, thereby demonstrating the convergence of the 'reasonableness' test in
step two of Chevron with the duty to engage in reasoned decisionmaking"); Levin, supra, at
1263 (claiming that the D.C. Circuit "has transformed the Chevron step two question of
whether the agency action was 'reasonable' into a question of whether it was 'reasoned').
38 See Farina, supra note 18, at 455 (concluding that Chevron "endorsed [the]
deferen[tial model] in emphatic terms"); White, supra note 19, at 730 (stating that Chevron
endorsed the deferential model).
39 See infra Part I.C.
[Vol. 84:185
2004] VALIDITY OF THE "CHECK-THE-BOX" REGULATIONS 193
debate among scholars. 40 Some suggest that the doctrine has its roots in
constitutional separation of powers principles, 4' while others argue that it arose
from judicial common law. 42 The prevailing theory, however, based on
language in recent Supreme Court cases, 43 is that Chevron deference is based
on presumed congressional intent.44 Under this theory, in the absence of a
specific directive from Congress on how agency interpretations should be
reviewed by courts, the Court has assumed the default rule that Congress
desires that politically accountable agencies (rather than the politically
insulated courts) be entrusted with primary interpretive responsibility with
regard to ambiguities and gaps within agency-administered statutes. 45 This
assumption (i.e., that Congress generally wants agencies to bear primary
interpretive responsibility), however, has been described by some scholars as a
fiction because it appears that "Congress rarely formulates an intent about who
will decide particular questions of statutory meaning. '46 In fact, there is some
evidence to suggest that legislators might actually prefer that courts, rather
than agencies, reconcile ambiguities and gaps in statutes.
47
40 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833,
863-73 (2002) (discussing the debate surrounding the basis for Chevron).
41 See Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 287-90 (1988); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2227 (1997); Kenneth W. Starr,
Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 308 (1986).
42 See Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of
Statutes? A New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1275, 1289-94; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 593, 618-19 (1992); David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference
to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 357-62 (2000).
41 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (applying
Chevron deference "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority").
4 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 40, at 870-72 (explaining that "the congressional-
intent theory is the best of the three explanations for the legal foundation of Chevron
deference").
41 Although the Chevron Court focused on an executive agency's responsiveness to the
President's influences, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 865 (1984), it is clear that executive agencies are also responsive to influence by
Congress and lobbyists. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2149-50 (2002).
46 Farina, supra note 18, at 471; see also Elhauge, supra note 45, at 2132 (arguing that
evidence of congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority to administrative agencies
absent explicit authorization to do so is "weak" or "fictional").
4" See Farina, supra note 18, at 473-74 (describing the near passage of the Bumpers
Amendment in 1975, which would have required federal courts to review all matters of law
de novo).
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Despite these suspect underpinnings, the Chevron doctrine has generally
been considered wise as a matter of policy. 48 The Chevron doctrine has been
described as furthering a number of policy goals,49 two of which are most
significant in regard to this article. First, by giving the executive branch
primary interpretive authority vis-A-vis the judicial branch with respect to
ambiguities and gaps left by Congress, Chevron allocates policy-making power
towards a politically accountable branch and away from a politically insulated
branch. 50
Second, Chevron gives agencies the flexibility to change and adapt their
policies to reflect the current state of affairs and political attitudes. 51 Under the
independent judgment model, the Court would interpret an ambiguous term on
its own, and the Court's interpretation would be binding on the public and the
executive branch by virtue of stare decisis. 52 Thus, under this model, if the
Court adopts interpretation X, that interpretation becomes binding precedent
even if the term is susceptible to a different interpretation. 53 If an agency
subsequently adopts interpretation Y, that interpretation would be invalid, at
48 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE 152-53 (1997);
Callahan, supra note 42, at 1289; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 333-34 (1993); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons
from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CH. L. REV. 481, 486 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 517-20; Peter L.
Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121-22
(1987); Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2091-2104 (1990) (extolling the policy virtues of Chevron). This view that Chevron is a
wise policy choice is by no means unanimous. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 18, at 515-16;
Merrill, supra note 16, at 998; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing
Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV.
83, 120-25 (1994) (contending that Chevron is not sound public policy).
41 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 41, at 2229-37 (discussing six goals furthered by
Chevron).
50 See id. at 2229 ("[A]gencies are in a position below Congress but above courts in the
institutional hierarchy in the policymaking context.").
"' See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64
(1984) ("[T]he agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis."); see also Smiley v.
Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) ("[T]he whole point of Chevron is to leave
the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.");
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991) (emphasizing that agencies must be allowed
to adapt their interpretations to adapt to changing circumstances).
52 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-75 (1989) (acknowledging
the stare decisis effect on the executive branch).
51 See Pierce, supra note 41, at 2225 (explaining that when courts "impose[] their own
constructions on ambiguous agency-administered statutes... [they] create binding
precedent").
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least to the extent that Y is inconsistent with X, even if Y is an entirely
reasonable interpretation. 54 Thus, the independent judgment model results in a
lock-in of a single interpretation, subject to change only by Congress.55
On the other hand, when the Court implements the Chevron doctrine, there
is no such lock-in effect. When the Court applies Chevron, it results in a very
limited stare decisis effect. 56 For example, assume that the Court determines
that a particular term is ambiguous under Chevron step one and that a
particular agency interpretation (interpretation X) is permissible under Chevron
step two. The only stare decisis effects resulting from such a determination are
the following: (1) the particular term is ambiguous under Chevron step one,57
and (2) interpretation X was reasonable under Chevron step two.51 Stare
decisis would have no impact on the validity of subsequent inconsistent
interpretation Y promulgated by the agency.5 9 So long as that interpretation
passes Chevron step two, the latter interpretation would be valid.60
C. United States v. Mead: The Return of the Independent Judgment Model
Although Chevron appeared to adopt conclusively the deferential model, the
recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mead Corp.61 has suggested
otherwise. Until Mead, it was not entirely clear what types of agency guidance
were entitled to Chevron deference. 62 Agency guidance can take a variety of
5' See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1996) (holding invalid an
agency interpretation that conflicted with the Court's prior interpretation made under the
independent judgment model).
11 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that when the Court interprets an ambiguous term under the independent judgment
model, "ambiguity (and hence flexibility) will cease with the first judicial resolution").
56 See id. at 248 (claiming that under Chevron, "the court does not purport to give the
statute a judicial interpretation").
57 See id. (maintaining that, when Chevron applies, the only judgment of the court that is
"final and irreversible" is the court's "identif[ication of] the scope of the statutory
ambiguity").
58 See id (asserting that, when Chevron applies, the Court's approval of one reasonable
agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute will not foreclose a later inconsistent,
reasonable agency interpretation).
'9 See id.
60 See id. ("[W]hen the agency's authoritative interpretation comes within the scope of
that ambiguity-and the court therefore approves it-the court will not be 'overruling' the
court's decision when it later decides that a different interpretation (still within the scope of
ambiguity) is preferable.").
61 533 U.S. 218.
62 John F. Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury
Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMmi. L. REV. 39, 46 (noting that, until
recently, the scope of Chevron was not clear). Although the Court had limited Chevron
deference to cases where an interpretation was made by the agency charged with
administering the particular statute, see Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649
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forms, from the most formal and general (e.g., regulations) to the most
informal and specific (e.g., litigating positions).63 An expansive view of
interpretations that qualify for Chevron deference would mean that many kinds
of agency interpretations would fall within the scope of Chevron.64 On the
other hand, a narrow view would shrink Chevron's scope by limiting the kinds
of agency interpretations eligible for deference. 65 Closely related to the issue
of Chevron's scope is the question of what sort of respect, if any, should be
afforded agency interpretations that do not qualify for Chevron deference.
In Mead, the Court provided some guidance on these issues. 66 In that case,
the United States Customs Service ("Customs") interpreted a statutory term in
a tariff classification ruling.67 The threshold issue in Mead was whether the
tariff classification ruling was an agency interpretation that qualified for
Chevron deference. 68
The Court first determined that not all authoritative agency determinations
triggered deference under Chevron.69 Rather, the Court found that an agency
interpretation would trigger Chevron deference only in two separate instances.
First, Chevron deference is triggered when there is an "express delegation [by
Congress] of specific interpretive authority. '70 Second, Chevron deference is
triggered when it "appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
(1990), and to cases where the agency had the statutory power to promulgate rules and
regulations, see EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1991), it was unclear
until Mead what types of interpretations by these agencies would not be given Chevron
deference. See Coverdale, supra, at 46-47 ("As late as 2000, a plausible argument could be
advanced that as a matter of positive law, Chevron deference applied to all positions that
represented the official view of an agency charged with the administration of a statute and
empowered to promulgate rules and regulations.").
63 See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1463-
66 (describing the various forms in which agency positions are expressed).
6 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 40, at 835 (explaining that the scope of "Chevron's
domain" depends on "what sorts of agency interpretations [are subject to] the mandatory
deference doctrine of Chevron").
65 See id.
6 The Supreme Court decision in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000),
foreshadowed the holding in Mead. In Christensen, the issue was whether an agency
position expressed in an opinion letter qualified for Chevron deference. Id. at 586. The
five-member majority concluded that only agency positions that have the "force of law" so
qualify, and that the position in question did not have the force of law. Id. at 587.
67 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). The specific issue was whether the
statutory term "[bound] [d]iaries" included day planners, described by the Court as "three-
ring binders with pages having room for notes of daily schedules and phone numbers and
addresses, together with a calendar and suchlike." Id. at 224-25.
68 Id. at 226.
69 See id. at 227.
70 Id. at 229.
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interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority. '71 Thus, in order for an agency interpretation to obtain the benefit of
Chevron deference in the absence of a specific directive from Congress, the
agency must show that Congress gave it a general grant of authority to make
rules having the effect of law in the particular form in which the interpretation
was issued.
The Court went on to provide that such a general grant of authority "may be
shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication
or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a
comparable congressional intent."'72  The Court reasoned that it could be
assumed "that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of
law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending
to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of
such force. 73
Turning to the tariff classification rulings at issue, the Court concluded that
there was no specific congressional delegation to Customs to issue these
rulings with the force of law. 74 Furthermore, although the Court found that
Customs had been given a general grant of authority to issue regulations with
the force of law, it found no such authority with respect to tariff classification
rulings. 75 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the rulings were
issued without notice and comment, were treated by Customs as not binding on
third parties, and were issued in large quantities by forty-six offices scattered
around the United States. 76
After concluding that the tariff classification rulings did not qualify for
Chevron deference, the Court next considered what level of respect, if any, was
to be afforded the rulings in interpreting the statutory language at issue.77 The
Court concluded that these agency interpretations should be given an amount
of respect proportional to their "power to persuade," citing the 1944 case
Skidmore v. Swifit & Co.78 As a result, the Mead Court affirmed the continuing
vitality of the independent judgment model in cases where the agency
interpretation failed to qualify for Chevron deference. In these cases, the court
will bear primary interpretive responsibility, and the weight given to the
agency's view will depend "upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade .... ,,79
71 Id. at 226-27.
72 Id. at 227.
73 Id. at 230.
74 Id. at 231-32.
75 Id. at 232.
76 Id. at 233.
77 Id. at 234.
78 Id. at 235 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S 134, 140 (1944)).
79 Id. at 228 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140)
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Unlike Chevron deference, "Skidmore respect" 80 is not based on any implied
delegation by Congress, since such implied delegation must necessarily have
been found lacking or else Chevron rather than Skidmore would have
applied.8 1 Rather, Skidmore respect is based in judicial common law and on
the notion that the view of an agency-expert in the relevant field and familiar
with the statutory scheme-is a relevant consideration. 82
Therefore, Mead indicates a two-tier system for agency interpretations.
With respect to agency interpretations in a format that Congress intends to
have the force of law (Mead-qualified interpretations), an agency position that
passes Chevron's deferential standard will control. With respect to agency
interpretations in any other format (non-Mead-qualified interpretations), the
80 Courts have commonly used the phrase "Skidmore deference" to refer to. the amount of
respect accorded agency interpretations under Skidmore. See, e.g., Scafar Contracting, Inc.
v. Sec'y of Labor, 325 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing an agency interpretation
that is sound when reviewed with Skidmore deference). This phrase, however, is an
oxymoron. Under Skidmore, the Court is charged with the primary interpretive
responsibility with regard to an ambiguous provision. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140
(indicating that the agency interpretation in question was "not controlling upon the court by
reason of [its] authority"); Clark Byse, Scope of Judicial Review in Informal Rulemaking, 33
ADMIN. L. REV. 183, 192 (1981) (stating that under the Skidmore formulation, the agency
interpretation is only looked to for guidance). In determining the single best meaning of the
provision, the court may or may not take into account the position of the expert agency,
depending on the facts and circumstances. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (holding that,
while the agency interpretation in question was "not controlling upon the courts by reason of
[its] authority," the interpretation nevertheless could be resorted to "for guidance" and that
the weight to be given such guidance depended upon the agency interpretation's "power to
persuade"). Thus, the court never technically defers to the agency position under Skidmore
even if the court ultimately adopts the position; the agency position is mere evidence
considered by the court in its attempt to determine the single best interpretation. See Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. at 247-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that while Skidmore deference
gives some weight to the agency position, the Court ultimately decides the meaning of the
statute). Under Chevron, a true deference doctrine, the Court does not purport to interpret
an ambiguous statute, instead deferring to any reasonable agency interpretation. See id. at
247 (indicating that the Court does not make a binding interpretation under Chevron, but
only approves the agency decision).
"1 See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229.
82 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139 (emphasizing that agency interpretations are "based
upon more specialized experience and broader investigations and information than is likely
to come to a judge in a particular case"). Other reasons have been cited for treating agency
positions with respect under Skidmore. Skidmore itself also recognized a value in nationally
uniform agency interpretations. See id. at 140 (arguing that interpretations should be
uniform unless there is a good reason); Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of
Decisions of California Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1203-06 (1995)
(asserting that judicial deference to agencies results in greater uniformity). In addition,
some have cited inter-branch comity as a basis for Skidmore respect. See, e.g., Coverdale,
supra note 62, at 55 (claiming Skidmore respect "reflects an elementary demand of
interbranch comity which courts have long recognized").
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Court will ultimately decide the proper meaning of the statute, providing the
agency view with some level of respect depending on context. As a result, it is
now clear that the independent judgment model survived Chevron and applies
to statutory interpretation cases that are decided without the benefit of a Mead-
qualified agency position. 83
D. The Conflict Between Chevron and Stare Decisis
Prior to Chevron, when the Court interpreted a statutory term under the
independent judgment model, such an interpretation would be given stare
decisis effect until Congress amended the statute. 84 In fact, the Court has
applied a "super-strong" presumption of correctness with regard to statutory
interpretation precedent. 85 The foundation for this presumption is that, unlike
in the constitutional interpretation context, Congress can always amend the law
if it disagrees with the Court's interpretation.8 6
The Court's strong reluctance to overturn its statutory interpretation
precedent is therefore based on the presumption that Congress approves every
Supreme Court interpretation unless Congress amends the underlying statute. 87
This presumption, like the presumption that underlies Chevron (that Congress
wants agencies to bear primary interpretive responsibility), 88 is questionable. 89
83 In fact, given the ambiguous "force of law" standard set forth by Mead, one could
argue that the case returns administrative law to the pre-Chevron era when the level of
judicial deference given to an agency's action was unpredictable. See David J. Barron &
Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SuP. CT. REv. 201, 226.
84 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-75 (1989) (holding
that stare decisis is important in areas of statutory interpretation because Congress remains
free to act on the Court's decisions).
8 See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996) (describing the great weight
of stare decisis in the area of statutory construction); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502
U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (finding that stare decisis "has special force in the area of statutory
interpretation"); Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172 (explaining that "the burden bome by the party
advocating the abandonment of an established precedent is greater where the Court is asked
to overrule a point of statutory construction"); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362-63 (1988).
86 See Neal, 516 U.S. at 295-96 (explaining that the basis for the super-strong
presumption is the notion that Congress is free to change the court's interpretation of the
legislation); Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202 (observing that with statutory interpretation, unlike
constitutional interpretation, Congress can override the judgment of the courts).
87 See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202 (suggesting that if Congress does not alter legislation in
response to a judicial decision, it has made a choice not to do so).
88 See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
89 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67,
98-103 (1988) (casting doubt upon the ability to presume intent from the collective inaction
of members of Congress). Eskridge also criticizes the super-strong presumption of
correctness on other grounds. See id. at 95-98 (questioning the relevance of "subsequent"
legislative intent); id. at 104-08 (arguing that the super-strong presumption may exacerbate
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As William Eskridge has noted, it is often impossible to draw inferences of
legislative support from inertia since "the structure of Congress makes it far
more likely that something will not happen (inaction) than it will (action). 90
Nevertheless, it is clear that the effect of stare decisis in statutory interpretation
cases is quite formidable. 91
What happens when an agency interprets a term in a manner that would
otherwise be permissible under Chevron step two but is inconsistent with a
prior Supreme Court interpretation 9 of that term? This issue presents a
conflict between stare decisis and Chevron.93  If Chevron controls, the
reasonable agency interpretation would prevail. Alternatively, if stare decisis
controls, the prior Supreme Court determination would prevail since the later
agency interpretation, even if reasonable, would be inconsistent with binding
precedent. The Court has held in a trilogy of cases that stare decisis controls in
this conflict. 94 These three cases therefore conclude that Supreme Court
existing dysfunctions in the legislative process).
90 Id. at 98.
1 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1989) (explaining
that statutory precedents are generally overruled where there has been an "intervening
development of the law").
92 To be clear, when I use the term "Supreme Court interpretation," I mean
interpretations by the Court under the independent judgment model, as opposed to
interpretations that were merely approved of by the Court under the deferential model.
When the Court implements the deferential model, it results in a very limited stare decisis
effect. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60. Unlike decisions made under the
independent judgment model, the Court does not determine the single best meaning of a
term. Rather, the Court merely decides whether the term is reasonably susceptible to the
agency's proffered interpretation. This does not foreclose the possibility that a different
interpretation may be permitted in future cases.
93 Pierce, supra note 41, at 2226. This conflict could arise only between a prior judicial
interpretation and Chevron step two, not between a prior judicial interpretation and Chevron
step one. If the statutory term admits of only one interpretation (i.e., the prior judicial
interpretation), the inconsistent agency interpretation would be struck down under Chevron
step one. Because the outcome would be the same regardless of whether Chevron or stare
decisis controlled, there would be no conflict. See id at 2225.
94 See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 290 (1996) (holding that a United States
Sentencing Commission interpretation was invalid because it was inconsistent with the
Court's prior interpretation); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1992)
(holding that a National Labor Relations Board interpretation was invalid because it was
inconsistent with the Court's prior interpretation); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary
Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130-31 (1990) (holding that the Interstate Commerce
Commission's interpretation was inconsistent with the Court's prior interpretation); see also
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Neal,
Lechmere, and Maislin for the proposition that "[o]nce the court has spoken, it becomes
unlawful for the agency to take a contradictory position; the statute now says what the court
has prescribed"); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 112
(1989) ("A rule of law that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague, ambiguous, or
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interpretations trump the deference owed under Chevron. As a result, pre-
Chevron Supreme Court interpretations are binding on the executive branch
and can be altered only if Congress amends the statute or if the Court decides
to overrule its prior interpretation despite its super-strong presumption of
correctness.
For example, in the 1996 case of Neal v. United States, the most recent case
in this trilogy, the Court considered the meaning of the statutory term "mixture
or substance" in determining the weight of lysergic acid diethylamide ("LSD")
to be taken into account for criminal sentencing purposes. 95 The Court had
previously interpreted the term in Chapman v. United States to include the
actual weight of blotter paper,96 even though such interpretation would result
in a "significant disparity of punishment meted out to LSD offenders relative
to other narcotics traffickers. '97 Two years after Chapman, the United States
Sentencing Commission (the "Commission") took the position that each dose
incomplete statutory provision is no less binding than a rule that is based on the plain
meaning of the statute."); PIERCE, supra note 16, § 3.6, at 185 ("The [Supreme] Court has
consistently held that a Supreme Court precedent trumps Chevron deference."); Bamberger,
supra note 18, at 1293-94 ("[E]ven after Chevron... court precedents always trump
Chevron deference."); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102
COLUM. L. REv. 2162, 2262 (2002) (stating that "the Chevron doctrine of deference to
agency interpretations does not apply when the agency deviates from a court's own
precedent interpreting the statute"); Merrill, supra note 16, at 989 (arguing that Maislin
"emphatically rejected the idea that an agency might disregard a previous judicial
construction of a statute, at least when it is a precedent of the Supreme Court"); Merrill &
Hickman, supra note 40, at 915 ("The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that agency
interpretations of statutes that deviate from the Court's own precedents are not entitled to
Chevron deference."); Pierce, supra note 41, 2226 (citing Neal, Lechmere, and Maislin as
the basis for the "mechanical rule[]" that "Supreme Court precedents always trump the
deference owed under Chevron").
Although the Supreme Court has concluded that its own precedents trump Chevron, it has
frequently upheld agency interpretations that are at odds with existing lower court prece-
dent. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 477, 482 (1999). The circuit
courts are divided on the issue of whether a prior interpretation of a term by the circuit will
foreclose any subsequent inconsistent agency interpretation with regard to that circuit.
Compare Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass'n of Am. v. Oman, 17 F.3d 344, 348
(1 th Cir. 1994) (holding that its precedent interpreting an ambiguous statutory term does
not foreclose subsequent inconsistent agency interpretation of that term), with Bankers Trust
N.Y. Corp. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that precedent
interpreting an ambiguous statutory term forecloses subsequent inconsistent agency inter-
pretation of that term), Indus. Turnaround Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir.
1997) (same), Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996) (same), and BPS Guard Ser-
vices, Inc. v. NLRB, 942 F.2d 519, 523 (8th Cir. 1991) (same).
95 516 U.S. at 288-90.
96 Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 468 (1991) (holding that "the weight of the
carrier medium must be included").
" Neal, 516 U.S. at 295.
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of LSD on any carrier medium would automatically be given a presumed
weight of 0.4 milligrams. 98 Citing to the first two cases in the trilogy, the Neal
Court unanimously held that the Commission's interpretation was invalid
because it could not be squared with the Court's prior holding in Chapman that
actual weight be used:
In these circumstances, we need not decide what, if any, deference is
owed the Commission in order to reject its ... interpretation. Once we
have determined a statute's meaning, we adhere to our ruling under the
doctrine of stare decisis, and we assess an agency's later interpretation of
the statute against that settled law.99
Essentially, this trilogy of decisions ending with Neal provides that when
the Court has independently interpreted a term on a prior occasion, that
interpretation becomes "incorporated" into the statute and binds the executive
branch. 00 Therefore, the ambiguity that existed with regard to the statutory
language at issue is settled, leaving no "space, so to speak, for the exercise of
continuing agency discretion."' ' 1
Because Chevron limited the ability of a court to interpret a statutory term
independently, this "incorporation rule"'1 2 generally will apply only in two
distinct contexts. The first instance is where the judicial interpretation was
made in the pre-Chevron era under the independent judgment model, rather
than the deferential model. 10 3 The second instance is where the judicial
98 Id. at 287.
99 Id. at 295. It is important to emphasize that the Neal Court decided that actual weight
was required to be used not because a contrary interpretation was inconsistent with the
statutory text, but rather because the contrary interpretation was inconsistent with its prior
interpretation of the statutory text in Chapman. See id. at 294.
"I See Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 130 (1990)
(holding invalid the Interstate Commerce Commission's interpretation because it is
inconsistent with the Interstate Commerce Act "as it incorporates" the Court's prior
interpretation of the Act); see also White, supra note 19, at 727 ("Judicial interpretations of
statutes in essence become part of the statutory scheme, until overruled by the Court or
Congress, and are binding on the agency").
'01 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12 This article uses the term "incorporation rule" to refer to the doctrine described supra
in the text accompanying notes 84-92. The term refers to the principle that the Supreme
Court's interpretation of a term under the independent judgment model effectively
incorporates that interpretation into the underlying statute. This forecloses any re-
interpretation of that term by the executive branch, even if such re-interpretation would have
been upheld under Chevron had it been issued in the absence of the earlier judicial
interpretation.
103 See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992) (holding that a 1955
precedent was controlling); Maislin, 497 U.S. at 131 (holding that a 1915 precedent was
controlling); see also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 40, at 915-20 (discussing the
application of the incorporation rule in cases when the judicial interpretation was not made
"in full awareness of Chevron and its two-step procedure"). It is important to note that in
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interpretation was made post-Chevron in the absence of a Mead-qualified
agency interpretation. 10 4  This second instance will occur if the judicial
interpretation was made in the absence of any agency position whatsoever,10 5
or if the judicial interpretation was made after considering a non-Mead-
qualified agency position.10 6  In both instances, the Court will have
independently interpreted the statute and that interpretation will trump any
later inconsistent agency interpretation. This trumping will occur even if the
Court, while independently interpreting the statute, adopts the precise
interpretation advocated by the agency after according the position
appropriate respect under Skidmore. 10 7
Commentators have criticized the incorporation rule, arguing that the rule is
inconsistent with the policy justifications underlying Chevron.10 8  While
Chevron recognizes that politically accountable agencies should bear primary
these cases, the Court determined that its pre-Chevron interpretations "need not be
reconsidered after Chevron in light of agency regulations that were already in force when
[the pre-Chevron] decisions were issued." Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 n.1
(2001). In other words, pre-Chevron Supreme Court interpretations are controlling on the
agency, even if they were inconsistent with then-existing agency positions that would have
been upheld under Chevron if the case had taken place in the post-Chevron era. Simply put,
Chevron does not apply retroactively to Supreme Court cases that were decided prior to
Chevron.
"o See, e.g., Neal, 516 U.S. at 295-96 (holding that a 1991 precedent was controlling);
see also Bamberger, supra note 18, at 1298-99 (discussing the application of the
incorporation rule where the judicial interpretation was made in the absence of a Mead-
qualified interpretation). Bamberger also notes that the incorporation rule could be
implicated in one other context: where a post-Chevron independent judicial interpretation is
made because a Mead-qualified agency interpretation is nonetheless struck down under
Chevron step two. Id. at 1298. This will rarely, if ever, occur, however, because Chevron
step two failures rarely, if ever, occur. See Levin, supra note 37, at 1261 (stating that as of
1997, "the [Supreme] Court has never once struck down an agency's interpretation, by
relying squarely on the second Chevron step").
105 See, e.g., Neal, 516 U.S. at 289 (involving a prior interpretation rendered in the
absence of an agency position on the matter).
106 See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 249-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What a court says is the
law after according Skidmore deference will be the law forever, beyond the power of the
agency to change even through rulemaking."); see also Bamberger, supra note 18, at 1300-
01 (describing the application of the incorporation rule where the post-Chevron judicial
interpretation was rendered after giving Skidmore respect to an agency position).
107 See Mead Corp., 533 U.S.. at 249-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108 See Merrill, supra note 16, at 989 (observing that "if a court has construed an
ambiguous statute one way (without the benefit of an agency view), and an agency later has
occasion to read the statute differently, the logic of Chevron would seem to indicate that the
court should follow the agency interpretation, rather than the earlier judicial
pronouncement"); see also Bamberger, supra note 18, at 1302 (suggesting that the
incorporation rule "frustrates the very policy justifications for the administrative state
articulated by the Supreme Court").
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interpretive responsibility with regard to ambiguous statutory language, the
incorporation rule, to the extent it applies, transfers this responsibility to the
politically-insulated judiciary. 0 9 Furthermore, because the incorporation rule
locks in the Court's interpretation pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, the
rule restricts the flexibility of agencies to amend the interpretation of an
ambiguous statute to reflect current political preferences and adapt to current
realities. 110
In addition, the incorporation rule results in wholly bizarre and unfortunate
practical consequences. Under the rule, if litigation involving an ambiguous
statute arrives at the Court prior to an agency rendering a Mead-qualified
interpretation, the Court will interpret the term independently, and its
interpretation will control forever, unless and until Congress amends the statute
or the Court takes the highly unusual step of overruling its precedent.1 11
Alternatively, if an agency renders a Mead-qualified interpretation before the
Court hears the case, the agency will forever bear primary interpretive
responsibility with regard to the statute, allowing the agency to change its mind
subject only to Chevron step two.112 As a result, the practical import of the
incorporation rule is that "the timing of judicial challenges becomes a
significant factor in determining policy; vagaries replace values."
1 13
109 See Bamberger, supra note 18, at 1295 (arguing that the incorporation rule
undermines Chevron in that, while "Chevron places the discretion to construe statutory
ambiguity outside the judicial ambit, the incorporation conception of precedent brings
policymaking within it").
"0 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that, unlike a
judicial determination that an agency interpretation is permissible under Chevron, a judicial
interpretation rendered without the benefit of a Mead-qualified interpretation "does not...
leave the matter within the control of the Executive Branch for the future").
11 See supra text accompanying notes 93-107.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
113 Bamberger, supra note 18, at 1304. In addition, in cases in which the agency
interpretation prevails, the incorporation rule places great importance as the basis for such
victory. For instance, if the agency position prevails because it was permissible under
Chevron step two, then a later reasonable, though inconsistent, position would be upheld.
See supra text accompanying notes 56-60. If, however, the agency position prevails
because it was the result of an independent judicial determination after giving the position
appropriate respect under Skidmore, then a later inconsistent though reasonable position
would be struck down. See supra text accompanying notes 80-86. The majority in Edelman
v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106 (2002), did not appreciate the effect of this subtle yet
significant distinction. In that case, the majority upheld an EEOC regulation's interpretation
without specifying the rationale for its decision. The Court found that "the EEOC rule [was]
not only a reasonable one, but the position [it] would adopt even if there were no formal rule
and [the Court was] interpreting the statute from scratch." Id. at 114. The Court further
stated that "because [it] so clearly agree[d] with the EEOC, there [was] no occasion to defer
and no point in asking what kind of deference, or how much." Id. Accompanying this last
sentence was a footnote clarifying that the Court was not holding "that the EEOC's position
is the 'only one permissible,"' implying that the EEOC was free to change its position
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Even worse, this nonsensical result, which could never be desired by any
rational legislator, 114 is actually the product of two doctrines that are based on
imputed legislative intent. As previously discussed, the Chevron doctrine is
based on the notion that Congress generally wants politically accountable
agencies to reconcile gaps and ambiguities, 15 while the Court's reluctance to
overturn its statutory interpretation precedents is based on the notion that any
Supreme Court interpretation left unchanged by Congress reflects Congress's
intention. 116 While these factual inferences are questionable, they are at least
facially plausible; however, the effect of their interaction (i.e., the importance
placed on the timing of judicial challenges) is preposterous.
This emphasis on timing creates unfortunate incentives for both agencies
and the Supreme Court. It creates the incentive for agencies to hastily draft
ambiguous Mead-qualified interpretations (such as notice-and-comment
regulations) in order to beat the Supreme Court to the punch and retain
"jurisdiction" over the statutory ambiguities. 1 7  These agencies could
thereafter issue less formal guidance clarifying the ambiguous Mead-qualified
interpretations. Because the Court gives Chevron-like deference to agency
interpretations of their own regulations, 118 this method would be a successful
subject only to Chevron step two. Id. at 114 n.8. As Justice O'Connor noted in her
concurring opinion, however, this footnote's implication (that the agency retained
flexibility) is only true if the Court's conclusion was based on Chevron deference. Id. at
122 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Otherwise, the Court was independently interpreting the
statute, and such interpretation would necessarily foreclose any future inconsistent
interpretation. Id. Therefore, there was a "point in asking what kind of deference" was
afforded the EEOC position-namely, to give guidance to the EEOC regarding the validity
of a later, inconsistent interpretation. Id at 114 (Souter, J.).
114 This silliness is clear when you consider the potential responses to the following
hypothetical question posed to a legislator drafting new legislation: "Who do you want to
have primary interpretive responsibility with regard to ambiguities and gaps in the new
statute?" The response that "it depends on whether a controversy arrives at the Supreme
Court before the agency issues a Mead-qualified interpretation" is completely implausible.
115 See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
116 See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
"7 See Bamberger, supra note 18, at 1302-03.
... See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220 (2001)
(holding that an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to
substantial judicial deference); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (finding that a
court should defer to an agency's construction of its regulations unless it is "plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation" (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 40, at 899 (identifying "a
substantial parallel between the Chevron doctrine and the Seminole Rock doctrine"). The
Seminole Rock doctrine has been criticized on various grounds. See John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations ofAgency Rules,
96 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 686-90 (1996) (criticizing the Seminole Rock doctrine because it is
inconsistent with contemporary separation of powers principles, and suggesting the doctrine
does not give agencies an adequate incentive to draft clear regulations).
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end run around the incorporation rule. Unfortunately, this end run results in
greater ambiguity and less deliberation with respect to formal guidance and the
proliferation of informal guidance.' 19
With respect to the Supreme Court, the importance of timing creates
improper incentives with regard to its case management. For instance, if the
Court embraces Chevron and its underlying principles, it will want to refrain
from granting certiorari in statutory interpretation cases where the agency
charged with administering the statute has not yet rendered a Mead-qualified
interpretation. By refusing to hear these cases, the Court leaves "a space, so to
speak, for the exercise of continuing agency discretion,"'' 20 giving the agency
the opportunity to interpret the term in a Mead-qualified manner and thus
retain primary interpretative authority. Had the Court accepted the case, it
would be forced to interpret the term independently, thereby locking in the
interpretation under stare decisis.12 1
119 The Mead decision, granting Chevron deference to only relatively formal agency
action, has itself been criticized for creating incentives for agencies to "rush out barebones,
ambiguous rules construing statutory ambiguities, which they can then in turn further clarify
through informal rulings entitled to judicial respect." United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 246 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For this strategy to be successful, the incorporation
rule requires the Mead-qualified rule to be promulgated prior to a Supreme Court
interpretation of the statute in question. Otherwise, the Supreme Court's interpretation will
be binding.
120 Id. at 247. A pro-Chevron Court would be especially hesitant to take a case in which
the agency had issued a regulation that, because it lacked retroactive effect, would not apply
in that case. For example, assume that the case involved a tax issue that arose in 2000 when
there was no Mead-qualified interpretation on point. In 2001, the Treasury promulgates a
Mead-qualified regulation that resolved the issue; however, the regulation (like most tax
regulations) lacked retroactive effect. See I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2000) (stating the general rule
that tax regulations are not retroactive). The Supreme Court, if it granted certiorari, would
independently interpret the term (without the benefit of the regulation because it would not
apply to the taxpayer's case), thereby locking in the judicial definition whether it was
consistent or inconsistent with the Treasury regulation. By denying certiorari, however, the
Treasury regulation would control going forward, and the Treasury would retain the
flexibility to change the regulation subject only to Chevron step two.
121 See supra text accompanying notes 80-82. Kenneth Bamberger has recently noted
that a pro-Chevron Court might revitalize the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine in an attempt
to leave the ambiguous statutory term within the jurisdiction of the agency. Bamberger,
supra note 18, at 1309-10. Under this doctrine, which Bamberger notes has not been
applied by the Court since Chevron, the Court would refer "specific issues of the type
usually resolved in agency adjudication" back to the agency prior to resolution of the case
by the Court. Id. at 1309. Bamberger ultimately concludes that the use of this doctrine to
avoid the problems caused by the incorporation rule would itself raise significant problems
such as increased costs and delay. Id. In the tax context, the primary jurisdiction doctrine
would be unworkable because the Mead-qualified interpretations of the Treasury (i.e.,
regulations) generally cannot have retroactive effect. See I.R.C. § 7805(b). Therefore, any
Treasury regulations promulgated after a referral by the Court under the "primary
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Alternatively, if the Court is hostile to Chevron and its principles, the
emphasis on timing will create an incentive for the Court to accept statutory
interpretation cases lacking a Mead-qualified interpretation. Such a Court
would be aggressive in seeking out these cases so that it could lock in a judicial
interpretation, thereby taking away agency discretion. As a result, the Court
would shift power from the executive branch to the judiciary. Accordingly,
regardless of the disposition of the Court towards Chevron, the "race" to
interpret creates a case management incentive that is entirely unrelated to the
merits of the petition for certiorari.
In summary, the incorporation rule undermines the principles behind
Chevron and places tremendous importance on the timing of judicial
challenges. This emphasis on timing in turn creates improper incentives for
both agencies and the Supreme Court in their "race" to interpret ambiguous
statutes. Nonetheless, the incorporation rule persists. In fact, it is so
entrenched that the Court has recently concluded that it is a "settled
principle."' 12
2
E. Chevron's Applicability to Tax Regulations
1. Pre-Chevron Law
Prior to Chevron, tax law had a relatively well-developed body of law
regarding the standard of judicial review of Treasury regulations interpreting
ambiguous tax statutes. 23 The standard depended on whether the regulation
was issued pursuant to authority granted in a specific Code provision (a
specific authority regulation), 124 or whether the regulation was issued pursuant
to the general grant of authority contained in § 7805(a) (a general authority
regulation). 125
The traditional view was that specific authority regulations 126 were
jurisdiction" doctrine would be issued too late to have any relevance to the taxpayer's case.
122 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 n.1 (2001).
123 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 40, at 838 (mentioning that tax had "substantial
bodies of precedent [about deference] that preexisted Chevron and deviated from it in
important respects"); see also Coverdale, supra note 62, at 72-76 (discussing traditional tax
deference doctrine with regard to Treasury regulations).
124 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 121(c)(2)(B) (authorizing Treasury to promulgate regulations
defining the term "unforeseen circumstances" for purposes of determining whether the gain
from the sale of principal residence may be excluded from gross income). There are over
one-thousand of these specific authority grants in the Code. See Edward J. Schnee & W.
Eugene Seago, Deference Issues in the Tax Law: Mead Clarifies the Chevron Rule-Or
Does It?, 96 J. TAX'N 366, 371 (2002) (counting approximately 1220 delegations of
authority in the Code).
125 I.R.C. § 7805(a) authorizes the Treasury to "prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code]." I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000).
126 Tax lawyers generally refer to these regulations as "legislative regulations" and
general authority regulations as "interpretive regulations." Coverdale, supra note 62, at 65-
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controlling unless they were determined to be arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the will of Congress. 127 Although it appears that this
standard is merely the product of merging Chevron's two steps into one, 128 it
has been argued that the historical deference afforded specific authority
regulations might actually be greater than that afforded under Chevron. 129
With regard to general authority regulations, they would be upheld if they
were reasonable implementations of congressional directives.1 30 In determin-
ing reasonableness, a court would focus on "whether the regulation harmonizes
with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose."' 131 Pursuant
to this analysis, a court could consider a number of factors, including "the
length of time the regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the
66. I refrain from using these terms because administrative law draws distinctions between
these terms in a vastly different way. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts,
Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467,
476-77 (2002) (defining legislative regulations as "those that have the force and effect of
law [such that] [f]rom the perspective of agency personnel, regulated parties, and courts,
these rules have a status akin to that of a statute" and interpretive regulations as all other
regulations). Therefore, in areas of the law other than tax, a regulation may be deemed
legislative regardless of whether it was promulgated pursuant to a general grant of authority.
See id. at 570 (explaining that unlike the FTC, FDA, and NLRB, the IRS "continues to
adhere to the notion that the... general rulemaking grant in section 7805(a)... confers
only interpretive, not legislative, rulemaking authority"). Because of the inconsistent use of
these terms, and because administrative law places great importance on the characterization
of a regulation as legislative or interpretive (as those terms are used for administrative law
purposes), see id. at 477-81, 1 will use the terms "specific authority" and "general authority"
rather than "legislative" and "interpretive."
27 See Coverdale, supra note 62, at 73-74 (describing the pre-Chevron standard with
respect to specific authority regulations).
128 With regard to specific authority regulations, Congress has specifically delegated
policy-making authority to the Treasury. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
Therefore, under a Chevron standard, these regulations would almost inevitably pass step
one, since Congress has explicitly left a gap for the Treasury to fill. See Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). As a result, one would
usually move directly to step two, which appears to operate much like the traditional
standard. See id. at 843.
129 See John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the
Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 35, 54-55 (1995) (suggesting that, because the
historical deference standard gave weight to Treasury's view even at step one of the
analysis, the historical standard may be even more deferential than Chevron). Coverdale
acknowledges that this distinction will not likely matter with regard to specific authority
regulations where Congress has intentionally left a gap for Treasury to fill since it is
"unlikely [in those instances] that a court would be able to find that Congress had directly
addressed the precise issue raised." Id.
130 Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476-77 (1979); see also
Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51,
57-61 (1996) (examining the pre-Chevron range ofjudicial deference).
131 Nat 'l Muffler Dealers Ass "n., 440 U.S. at 477.
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consistency of the Commissioner's interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny
Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the
statute."
132
This multi-factor standard differs from Chevron's two step analysis.1 33
Many of the factors seem to have little or no significance under Chevron,
although some might be relevant under Chevron step two.' 34 Despite this
difference, it is unclear to what extent, if any, the multi-factor test produced
outcomes different than that which would have resulted under Chevron. 1
35
2. Does Chevron Apply to Tax Law?
In the decade or so after Chevron, it was unclear to what extent, if any, this
well-developed deference law was displaced by Chevron.'36 During this
period, courts reviewing tax regulations sometimes used the traditional
standard of review and other times used the Chevron standard. Professor John
Coverdale has attributed this failure to apply Chevron consistently to "the
sociology of the tax bar and bench."' 137 Coverdale explains, "The tax bar is
highly specialized, and its members rarely litigate cases that challenge non-tax
regulations. Senior tax lawyers in the private sector, in the IRS or on the bench
of the Tax Court may, therefore, simply be unaware of Chevron."'
38
Eventually, however, the tide turned and the courts began to apply the Chevron
methodology to tax cases on a consistent basis.' 39
132 Id.
133 For a discussion of the multi-factor standard and its relationship to Chevron in tax
cases, see generally Aprill, supra note 130.
134 For example, if an agency changes a long-standing interpretation that has been
frequently relied upon, a court might require a very thoughtful deliberation by the agency
before accepting the new interpretation under Chevron step two. See Pierce, supra note 41,
at 2252-53 (emphasizing the significance the Court places on the decisionmaking process
when applying Chevron step two to changes in agency precedent).
131 See Aprill, supra note 130 at 58-59, 63-73 (discussing and comparing multi-factor
and Chevron standards).
136 See Coverdale, supra note 129, at 53-57 (concluding that between 1984 and 1995, out
of the more than fifty cases analyzing the validity of specific authority regulations, only
fourteen cited Chevron, and that as of 1995, "[c]ourts rarely apply Chevron's two-step mode
of analysis to general authority regulations"). But see David A. Brennen, Treasury
Regulations and Judicial Deference in the Post-Chevron Era, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 387,
417 (1997) (suggesting that the decisions in Coverdale's sample were consistent with the
outcomes that would have resulted under Chevron's methodology).
137 Coverdale, supra note 129, at 53 n.121.
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., Atd. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 523 U.S. 382, 387 (1998); Conn. Gen. Life
Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 177 F.3d 136, 143-45 (3d Cir. 1999); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
United States, 142 F.3d 973, 983-84 (7th Cir. 1998); ABC Rentals of San Antonio, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 142 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 1998); Redlark v. Comm'r, 141 F.3d 936, 939-40
(9th Cir. 1998); Harbor Bancorp & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 115 F.3d 722, 727 (9th Cir.
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3. Are General Authority Regulations Mead-Qualified?
Under Mead, Chevron deference clearly applies to specific authority
regulations where Congress has specifically delegated gap-filling authority for
the Treasury to implement through regulation. 140 The question that remains is
whether Chevron deference or, alternatively, Skidmore respect, applies to
general authority regulations. 141
General authority regulations would qualify for Chevron deference if "it
[was] apparent from the [Treasury's] generally conferred authority and other
statutory circumstances that Congress would expect" that these regulations
would carry "the force of law.'142 Although the resolution of this issue is not
entirely clear, 143 the courts, in the few cases that have addressed the issue since
1997); Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Comm'r, 87 F.3d 99, 104-06 (3d Cir. 1996); Peoples Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n of Sidney v. Comm'r, 948 F.2d 289, 299 (6th Cir. 1991); Robinson v.
Comm'r, 119 T.C. 44, 68 (2002) (each citing Chevron while analyzing the validity of a
Treasury regulation). Accord PIERCE, supra note 16, § 3.5 at 167-68 (concluding that
Chevron applies to tax regulations); Coverdale, supra note 62, at 77 (concluding that "as the
years went by [the courts have] turned somewhat more frequently to Chevron" when
analyzing the validity of specific authority regulations). The Supreme Court has never made
it entirely clear that Chevron displaced traditional notions of tax deference. For example, in
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, the Court cited Chevron with regard to step
one of its analysis but then curiously cited Cottage Savings Ass 'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S.
554, 560-61 (1991), rather than Chevron for its step two analysis. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 523
U.S. at 387, 389. More recently, in Boeing Co. v. United States, even though the Court
failed to cite Chevron in analyzing the validity of a general authority regulation, it applied a
very Chevron-like analysis, concluding that the regulation was entitled to "deference" and
upholding the regulation because it was "not arbitrary." 537 U.S. 437, 449, 451 (2003).
140 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
1 Recall that this distinction affects not only the quantity of respect given to the
regulation, but also the quality of the judicial action necessitated by a review of the
regulation. If Chevron deference applies, the court will not independently interpret the
term; if Skidmore respect applies, the court will independently interpret the term and stare
decisis will be triggered with regard to such interpretation. See supra text accompanying
notes 77-83.
142 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229.
143 Chevron itself involved an environmental regulation promulgated pursuant to the
EPA's general grant of authority to prescribe such regulations as necessary, see 42 U.S.C. §
7601(a)(1), suggesting that the Treasury's general authority regulations should likewise
merit Chevron deference. If Treasury's only mechanism for making policy was through the
promulgation of regulations that were specifically authorized by Congress, it would
undermine the Chevron notion that Congress implicitly leaves policy-making authority to
the agency (rather than the courts) when it leaves ambiguities and gaps within its statutes.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
Furthermore, Treasury's general authority regulations are promulgated after notice and
comment, a procedural formality emphasized by the Mead Court as indicative of force-of-
law interpretations. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 230-31. Additionally, a general authority
regulation is a rule of general applicability rather than an agency action that is limited in its
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Mead, appear to be giving Chevron deference to these regulations.' 44 Because
this article argues that the check-the-box regulations, which were issued
pursuant to Treasury's general authority, 145 are invalid, it is assumed below
operation, another factor considered by the Mead Court. See id. at 233-34.
Some commentators have argued, however, that general authority regulations do not
merit Chevron deference. See Coverdale, supra note 62, at 83-89; Schnee & Seago, supra
note 124, at 369-70. They note that Treasury, by deciding that these regulations do not re-
quire notice and comment, essentially admits that they lack the "force of law." Coverdale,
supra note 62, at 84-85. Although Treasury takes the position that notice and comment is
not required, it regularly submits to notice and comment on a voluntary basis. MICHAEL J.
SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3.02[3], at 3-6 (2d ed. 1991). Furthermore,
these commentators believe that Congress's frequent use of specific authority in the Code
suggests that Congress does not desire that Treasury act with the force of law when it prom-
ulgates general authority regulations. Coverdale, supra note 62, at 85. In addition, the
commentators argue that the historical tax deference doctrine, which treated general author-
ity regulations with less respect than specific authority regulations, should be understood as
a backdrop against which Congress legislated. Id. at 86-87. According to this argument, by
giving specific authority in the Code, Congress signals its desire to have the courts defer to
the Treasury's position; by failing to give such specific authority, Congress signals its desire
to have the courts give greater scrutiny to the Treasury's position. Id. Finally, the commen-
tators point to pervasive congressional involvement in tax law, evidencing "Congress's
strong preference for making policy choices itself rather than leaving them to the Treasury."
Id. at 87.
I44 See, e.g., Marsh & McLennan Cos. v. United States, 302 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (citing Mead in applying Chevron to a general authority regulation without discussing
the distinction between general authority and specific authority regulations); Tax Analysts v.
I.R.S., 215 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing Mead for the proposition that
Chevron applies to general authority regulation because the regulation was "enacted... in a
formal rulemaking process"); Robinson v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 44, 68-70 (2002) (applying
Chevron to a temporary general authority regulation post-Mead without citing or discussing
Mead); see also U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 2001);
Landmark Legal Found. v. I.R.S., 267 F.3d 1132, 1135-36 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Am. Express
Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v.
United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 203, 212-13 n.5 (2003) (each suggesting in dicta that Mead
mandates giving Chevron deference to all regulations promulgated with full notice and
comment); Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 731, 750 (2002) (concluding that after Mead, it is "clear that Chevron's framework
is applicable to [general authority] regulations"). But see Robinson, 119 T.C. at 119-20
(Vasquez, J., dissenting); Coverdale, supra note 62, at 83-89; Schnee & Seago, supra note
124, at 369 (arguing that general authority regulations do not qualify for Chevron deference
under Mead). As noted in note 139, supra, in Boeing Co. v. United States, the Court
recently upheld a general authority regulation, reasoning that it merited "deference" and was
"not arbitrary." 537 U.S. 437, 448-49 (2003). Curiously, even though the Court applied a
very Chevron-like analysis by deferring to a non-arbitrary agency position, it cited neither
Mead nor Chevron.
115 See Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584 (Dec. 18, 1996)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 301, 602) (codifying regulations that classify business
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW
that they qualify for the highly deferential Chevron standard of review.
However, the analysis would be equally applicable even if they qualified only
for respect under Skidmore.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEFINITION OF "ASSOCIATION":
FROM MORRISEY TO CHECK-THE-BOX
The check-the-box regulations govern the classification of unincorporated
business entities as corporations or partnerships for federal income tax
purposes.146 This classification is critical, primarily because the earnings of a
corporation are generally subject to two levels of tax, while the earnings of a
partnership are subject only to one.
When a corporation earns income, a corporate income tax is imposed on the
corporation with respect to that income. 147  When the corporation then
distributes its after-tax earnings to its shareholders, an individual income tax is
imposed on the shareholders with respect to the distribution. 148 On the other
hand, when a partnership earns income, only its shareholders are taxed on their
share of the income, 149 and there is no additional tax imposed when the
partnership then distributes the income to its partners. 50 In other words, the
income of a partnership flows through the partnership to its partners and is
reported on the partners' individual tax returns.
In general, every business entity is classified as either a corporation or a
partnership for tax purposes. 151 In classifying a business entity, one first looks
to the definition of "corporation" in § 7701(a)(3). Any business entity that
falls outside this definition is classified by default as a partnership pursuant to
§ 7701(a)(2).
Since 1918, § 7701(a)(3) and its predecessors have defined the term
corporation as follows: "The term 'corporation' includes associations, joint-
stock companies, and insurance companies."' 5 2 As a result, the Code imposes
organizations under an elective regime).
14 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in 2002).
14 I.R.C. § 11 (2000). Certain corporations are subject to unique taxing regimes. See
supra note 3.
148 See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7), 301(c)(1), 316 (2000) (providing that dividends are included
in gross income and defining the term dividend as corporate distributions out of earnings
and profits).
141 See I.R.C. §§ 701, 702 (2000) (providing that partners, and not the partnership itself,
are taxed on partnership income and that partners are taxed on their distributive shares of
partnership income, respectively).
150 I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(A) (2000).
"I' Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2002). Business entities with a single
owner are classified either as a corporation or as an entity that is disregarded for tax
purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2002). For simplicity purposes, I
assume that all business entities discussed below have at least two owners.
152 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3). See also Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1. As far back as 1894,
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an income tax not only on state-law corporations, but also on associations.153
During the infancy of the income tax, the definition of the term "association"
baffled courts and administrators. 54 In 1935, the Supreme Court in Morrissey
v. Commissioner'55 finally provided some definitive guidance as to the
meaning of "association."
A. Morrissey v. Commissioner
In Morrissey, the question was whether, during the taxable years of 1924
through 1926, a trust was taxable as a corporation, which in turn depended on
whether the trust constituted an association. 56 Pursuant to the trust instrument,
the trustees were authorized to acquire, construct, and operate golf courses. 57
The trust also provided that the beneficiaries would not be personally
responsible for the trust's debts. 158 The beneficial interests of the trust were
evidenced by transferable certificates similar to stock certificates issued by
corporations. 59 All of the decisions with respect to the trust corpus would be
made by the trustees, and the beneficiaries had no power to elect or remove
trustees.' 60 The term of the trust was twenty-five years, notwithstanding the
death of any trustee or beneficiary.' 6 1
The trust's position that it was not an association was based on Regulation
45, which was promulgated in 1921162 and superceded by the issuance of
Regulation 65 in 1924.163 Regulation 45 provided that a trust would constitute
an association only if the beneficiaries "have a voice in the conduct of the
business of the trust, whether through the right periodically to elect trustees or
the tax laws used the term "association" interchangeably with "corporation." See Revenue
Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32 (applying tax on "corporations, companies, or associations");
Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38 (applying tax on "every corporation, joint stock company,
or association"); Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IIG(a) (applying tax on the net income of
"every corporation, joint-stock company or association"); Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §
10 (taxing "every corporation, joint-stock companies or association" ).
153 See I.R.C. § 11(a) (2000) (imposing a tax on the taxable income of every
corporation).
114 See Coleman-Gilbert Assocs. v. Comm'r, 76 F.2d 191, 193 (1st Cir. 1935) (describing
the law dealing with the definition of association as being "in a hopeless state of
confusion").
115 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
156 Id. at 347.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. The trustees could voluntarily hold meetings "for the purpose of making reports
or considering recommendations, but the votes of the [beneficiaries] were to be advisory
only." Id.
161 Id. at 347-48.
162 Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1504, T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 352, 591 (1921).
163 Treas. Reg. 65, art. 1504, T.D. 3640, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 745, 1003 (1924).
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otherwise."' 164 Thus, Regulation 45 announced a control test: only if the
beneficiaries had some control over the corpus of the trust would the trust be
considered an association. 165
In Regulation 65, Treasury discarded the control test, deciding that the key
issue was whether the trust was "carrying on some business enterprise."' 66
Under this business enterprise test, a trust that engaged in any business activity
would be considered an association, regardless of the level of beneficiary
control. 167
The trust in Morrissey argued that, since the beneficiaries had no control
over the trust corpus, the trust was not an association under Regulation 45.168
The trust argued that Regulation 65, which ordinarily would apply to the
taxable years in question, was invalid because the standard set forth in
Regulation 45 was effectively "incorporated" into the statute by virtue of the
intervening congressional enactment of the Revenue Act of 1924, which re-
enacted the definition of corporation as including associations. 169 The Court
disposed of this argument in a manner that foreshadowed Chevron:
As the statute merely provided that the term "corporation" should include
"associations," without further definition, the Treasury Department was
authorized to supply rules for the enforcement of the Act within the per-
missible bounds of administrative construction. Nor can this authority be
deemed to be so restricted that the regulations, once issued, could not
later be clarified or enlarged so as meet administrative exigencies or con-
form to judicial decision. We find no ground for the contention that by
the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1924 the Department was limited to
its previous regulations as to associations. 170
In finding an ambiguity in the statute, the Morrissey Court recognized a
"space, so to speak, for the exercise of continuing agency discretion.', 71 As a
result, the Court determined that the agency could change its mind with respect
to the interpretation of the term association, notwithstanding an intervening re-
enactment of the underlying statute.
14 Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1504, T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 591.
165 Id.
166 Treas. Reg. 65, art. 1504, TD. 3640, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. at 1003.
167 Id. The regulation contrasted trusts that carry on some business enterprise with
"[h]olding trusts, in which the trustees [were] merely holding property for the collection of
the income and its distribution among the beneficiaries." Id. (holding trusts would not
constitute associations).
168 Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1935).
169 Brief for the Petitioner at 30-35, Morrissey (No. 17). The Revenue Act of 1924 was
enacted on June 2, 1924, see Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, between the
promulgation of Regulation 45 in 1921, see 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 625, and the
promulgation of Regulation 65 on October 6, 1924, see 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 1049.
170 296 U.S. at 354-55 (citation omitted).
171 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Even though the Court dismissed the trust's arguments in a Chevron-like
manner, the similarities end there. The government argued that the standard
set forth in Regulation 65, that all business trusts constituted associations,
should control.1 72 Had the case arisen post-Chevron, the Court's task would
have been merely to determine whether the Treasury's Mead-qualified position
in Regulation 65 was permissible under step two,1 7 3 as the Court had already
found the term in question to be ambiguous. 17 4 Because the regulation would
likely have passed this deferential standard, the Court would then have applied
the regulation and concluded that the trust was an association because it
conducted a business enterprise.1 75
Instead of merely deferring to the regulation's business enterprise test,
however, the Morrissey Court did exactly what Chevron now proscribes. 176
Applying the independent judgment model, the Court exalted its own view
over the judgment of the Treasury. 177 After "a further examination of the
congressional intent," the Court disregarded the regulation and independently
172 Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 349. The Court continued:
The Government insists that the distinction between associations and the trusts [not
taxable as associations] is between "business trusts on the one side" and other trusts
"which are engaged merely in collecting the income and conserving the property
against the day when it is to be distributed to the beneficiaries"; that Congress intended
that all "business trusts" should be taxed as associations.
Id.; see also Brief for the Respondent at 6, Morrissey (No. 17) ("We submit that Congress
intended that all business trusts should be taxed as associations, and hence that the 'doing
business' test which is emphasized by many decisions is the single criterion on which this
case should depend.") The government's alternative argument was that a corporate
resemblance test should be applied. Id. at 7 ("If it is necessary to have regard for anything
more than the activities of the organization and doing business is not the sole test, we think
that an organization which does business and enjoys the substantial advantages of
centralized control, continuity, and limited liability is an association within the meaning of
the statute."). The government preferred the business enterprise test to the corporate
resemblance test ultimately adopted by the Court because it believed the latter test was too
imprecise. Id. at 20-21.
173 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (setting out the two-step test).
174 See Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 354-55 (pointing out that the statute was not clear enough
in defining the rule that associations should be included in the term "corporation").
175 The Court did in fact determine that the trust "involved what was essentially a
business enterprise." Id. at 360. Accordingly, under the business enterprise test, the trust
would have been characterized as an association.
176 One might believe that, because Morrissey violates Chevron principles, Morrissey
could be overruled on the basis that it is demonstrably erroneous. The Court has
determined, however, that it is a "settled principle" that pre-Chevron interpretations "need
not be reconsidered after Chevron in light of agency regulations that were already in force
when [the pre-Chevron] decisions were issued." Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281
n.1 (2001).
171 Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 356-57.
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interpreted the term "association" to mean any unincorporated business entity
that resembles a corporation.1 78 In applying this corporate resemblance test,
the Court identified the following four corporate factors: (1) perpetual
existence of the entity notwithstanding the death of owners or their agents, (2)
centralization of the entity's management (through, for example, a board of
directors or trustees), (3) free transferability of beneficial interests without
affecting the continuity of the business entity, and (4) the entity's provision of
limited liability for its owners. 179
In announcing this test, the Court did not identify the weight to be given to
each of these factors, appearing to use an overall facts and circumstances
test.180 Nor did the Court provide any guidance regarding the degree of
corporate similarity necessary in order for an entity to be considered an
association. 181
Despite the imprecision of Morrissey's corporate resemblance test, the
standard was easy to apply to the trust at issue. The Court found all four
corporate factors present and therefore determined that the trust constituted an
association.1 82 Notably, this is the same conclusion that would have resulted
had the Court merely applied Regulation 65's business enterprise test.18 3
B. The Kintner Regulations
Morrissey's imprecise corporate resemblance test remained intact until
1960.184 In 1960, the Treasury promulgated regulations, commonly known as
the Kintner Regulations, 185 which provided a more quantifiable standard. 186
Although the Kintner Regulations cited to Morrissey,187 retained its corporate
178 Id.
179 Id. at 359. For an extensive discussion of these factors, see Stephen B. Scallen,
Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49 MiNN. L. REV.
603, 631-37 (1965).
180 Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 358-59; see also Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 104
(5th Cir. 1969) (asserting that Morrissey "gave no indication of the relative weight to be
accorded the corporate attributes discussed").
181 See Kurzner, 413 F.2d at 104 (remarking that, although Morrissey emphasized
similarity, it "unfortunately did not specify a requisite degree of similarity").
182 Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 360-61.
183 Id. at 353-54
184 See, e.g., United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418, 421-24 (9th Cir. 1954) (applying the
Morrissey standard); Rev. Rul. 57-341, 1957-2 C.B. 884, 886 (1957) (same).
185 See Scallen, supra note 179, at 671 (describing the 1960 regulations as "'Kintner'
Regulations"). This name arose from the case United States v. Kintner, which held that a
professional association constituted a corporation for tax purposes. 216 F.2d at 428.
186 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -11 (1960); T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409 ("An
unincorporated organization shall not be classified as an association unless such
organization has more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics.").
187 T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409, 413 (adopting regulation § 301.7701-2(a)(1) which cites
Morrissey for the proposition that an organization is treated as an association if it
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resemblance standard, 188 and used its corporate factors, 89 the regulations
provided a mechanical, bright-line test as opposed to Morrissey's vague overall
facts and circumstances standard.1 90
In particular, the regulations differed from Morrissey in two important ways.
First, while Morrissey did not specify the relative weight to be given to each of
the four corporate factors, the Kintner Regulations assigned each factor an
equal weight.' 9' Second, while Morrissey never explained how much
corporate resemblance is required, the regulations provided that, in order for an
unincorporated business entity to be classified as an association, the entity
would have to possess at least three of the four corporate factors. 92
Despite the regulations' retention of the corporate resemblance test, it is
clear that the regulations were intended to create different substantive results
than would occur under Morrissey. The Treasury's motivation in pro-
mulgating these regulations was to restrict the ability of professionals to form
associations in order to take advantage of pension and profit-sharing benefits
then available only to corporations. 93 This restriction was accomplished by
forcing an unincorporated entity to have at least three out of the four corporate
factors in order to be classified as an association.' 94
"resembles a corporation" and § 301.7701-2(c)(2), which cites Morrissey in a discussion of
the centralization of management in an organization).
188 See id. (adopting regulation § 301.7701-2(a)(1), which states that "[a]n organization
will be treated as an association if the corporate characteristics are such that the organization
more nearly resembles a corporation than a partnership or trust").
189 See id. at 414-17 (adopting regulation §§ 301.7701-2(b), discussing continuity of life,
-2(c), discussing centralization of management, -2(d), discussing limited liability, and -2(e),
discussing free transferability of interests).
190 See id. at 414 (adopting § 301.7701-2(a)(3)).
191 See id. at 413-14 (describing four corporate characteristics, and requiring more
corporate characteristics than not for an organization to be classified as an association).
192 See id.
"' 1 MCKEE ET AL., supra note 1, 3.06, at 3-57 (concluding that "there is no question
that the proximate inspiration for the 1960 Regulations was to limit the availability of
qualified pension benefits by narrowing the substantive scope of the association concept").
194 At the time the Kintner Regulations were promulgated, professionals were generally
unable to form corporations under state law. See Patrick E. Hobbs, Entity Classification:
The One Hundred-Year Debate, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 437, 489 (1995). In response to the
Kintner Regulations, state legislatures began adopting professional corporation statutes. See
id. In turn, the Treasury amended the Kintner Regulations to deny corporate status to
professional corporations. T.D. 6797, 1965-1 C.B. 553 ("[A] professional service
organization... would not be classified for purposes of taxation as a 'corporation' merely
because the organization was so labeled under local law."). This amendment was repeatedly
struck down by courts as arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Kurzner v. United States, 413
F.2d 97, 112 (5th Cir. 1969). The IRS finally conceded defeat in 1970. See Rev. Rul. 70-
101, 1970-1 C.B. 278 (1970) (ruling that it will treat professional corporations as
corporations for tax purposes). For a discussion of the Treasury's losing war with
professional associations, see Hobbs, supra, at 488-91.
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Under the incorporation rule previously discussed, 95 it is arguable whether
the mechanical Kintner Regulations were valid because they were inconsistent
with Morrissey's overall facts and circumstances standard in determining what
constitutes an association. 196  The regulations did, however, retain the
corporate resemblance framework, using the very same factors identified in
Morrissey. In support of the regulations, one could argue that they merely
provide a permissible clarification of the Morrissey framework. In Chevron
terms, Morrissey left some gaps to fill (i.e., how much weight to give each
factor and how much overall resemblance was required) and the Treasury
arguably filled these gaps in a reasonable manner.197 Although commentators
criticized the regulations as straying from the Morrissey standard, 98 they were
never challenged on that ground during their thirty-six-year existence. 199 Thus,
no court ever considered whether the regulations were invalid in light of
Morrissey.
C. The Enactment of§ 7704
The next major development in the tax classification of business entities was
Congress's enactment of § 7704 in 1987.200 Section 7704 automatically
classified publicly traded partnerships as corporations, even though they would
not be so classified under the Kintner Regulations. 20' Prior to the enactment of
§ 7704, these publicly traded partnerships were structured to fail two corporate
characteristics in order to avoid corporate status; 202 however, in practical
195 See supra text accompanying notes 92-101.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 191-197 (describing the differences between the
Kintner Regulations and the Morrissey standard).
197 See White, supra note 19, at 759 (arguing that, "when a silence or ambiguity exists in
the Court's construction of the statute, realization of the values underlying Chevron is best
accomplished when the Court defers to the agency's resolution of such policy choices").
'9' See, e.g., Scallen, supra note 179, at 693-94 (criticizing the Kintner Regulations as
inconsistent with Morrissey and subsequent case law).
199 See 1 MCKEE ET AL., supra note 1, 3.06, at 3-58 n.223 (noting that the validity of the
Kintner Regulations was never challenged).
200 See Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211, 101 Stat. 1330-382, 1330-
403 (1987).
201 See I.R.C. § 7704(a), (b) (treating partnerships that are publicly traded as corpor-
ations).
202 These partnerships typically did not exhibit the corporate characteristics of limited
liability and perpetual existence. See, e.g., Larson v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 159, 175, 183, 185
(1976) (concluding that the two limited partnerships involved were not taxable as
corporations under the Kintner Regulations because they lacked the corporate characteristics
of limited liability and perpetual existence). These entities generally failed to meet the
perpetual existence standard because they would automatically dissolve upon the will or
bankruptcy of a general partner and failed limited liability because a sufficiently capitalized
general partner remained responsible for the partnership's debts. See, e.g., id. at 173-75,
179-82.
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effect, they operated much like publicly traded corporations.2 0 3 The impetus
behind § 7704 was congressional concern that, because of the similarity
between these partnerships and publicly traded corporations, the publicly
traded partnership would soon become the entity of choice for publicly traded
businesses, resulting in a significant erosion of the corporate tax base.204 To
prevent this erosion, § 7704 automatically classified publicly traded
partnerships as corporations, ensuring consistent tax treatment for these entities
and publicly-traded corporations. 20 5
It is important to emphasize that § 7704 was built upon the groundwork laid
by Morrissey. The text of § 7704 clearly indicates that the section concerns
only partnerships, 20 6 which were defined through an application of the
corporate resemblance test at the time § 7704 was enacted.20 7 Therefore, in
203 See H.R. REP. No. 100-391(11), at 1066 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-
378, 2313-681 (reasoning that "[p]ublicly traded partnerships resemble publicly traded
corporations in their business functions and in the way their interests are marketed, and
limited partners as a practical matter resemble corporate shareholders").
204 See id at 1065 (remarking that "[t]he recent proliferation of publicly traded
partnerships... has caused concern about long-term erosion of the corporate tax base").
See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., TAX TREATMENT OF MASTER
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 31-34 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter MLP REPORT] (discussing
potential erosion of the corporate tax base). With regard to the proliferation of publicly
traded partnerships, there were concerns other than the erosion of the corporate tax base. As
a practical matter, only certain types of businesses would have the opportunity to use the
publicly traded partnership form and avoid the corporate tax, resulting in a tax-created
competitive advantage for these businesses. See id. at 35. In addition, there was some
concern that the highly complex partnership tax rules governing partnerships were not well
designed to deal with entities with a substantial number of owners. See id at 24-25.
205 I.R.C. § 7704(a) (indicating that "a publicly traded partnership shall be treated as a
corporation"). For purposes of § 7704, the term "publicly traded partnership" is generally
defined as any partnership the interests of which are either "traded on an established
securities market" or "are readily tradable on a secondary market." Id. § 7704(b). Certain
partnerships with primarily passive income are excluded from the definition. See id. §
7704(c), (d) (exempting a publicly traded partnership from being treated as a corporation if
ninety percent of its income is derived from interest, dividends, real property rents or sales,
mining, sales of capital assets, commodities, futures, forwards, and options). In addition,
§ 7704(g) provides for transition rules for certain publicly traded partnerships in existence
prior to the enactment of § 7704. See id § 7704(g) (providing opportunity for existing
partnerships to elect a 3.5% tax on gross income instead of being taxed as a corporation).
For a detailed discussion of § 7704 and related regulations, see 1 McKEE ET AL., supra note
1, 3.09, at 3-116 to 3-127.
. 206 See I.R.C. § 7704(b) (defining the term "publicly traded partnership" as any
partnership whose interests are "traded on an established securities market" or "readily
tradable on a secondary market").
207 See MLP REPORT, supra note 204, at 8 (describing how the Kintner Regulations
enacted after Morrissey classified business entities as partnerships or corporations via the
corporate resemblance test).
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determining whether an entity was subject to § 7704, the first step was to
analyze whether the entity constituted a partnership under such test.20 8 Only
after concluding that the entity was a partnership would the second step of
determining whether the entity was publicly traded become necessary. 20 9 As a
result, the text of § 7704 clearly indicates that, in enacting the provision,
Congress was aware of the corporate resemblance test then applicable. 210
After the enactment of § 7704, all publicly traded entities would be taxable
as corporations. 211 Accordingly, the Morrissey standard remained relevant
only in the classification of unincorporated, nonpublicly-traded entities. It is in
this context that the next major development in the tax classification of
business entities occurred.
D. The Proliferation of the Limited Liability Company
Beginning in the late 1980s, a novel business entity form began to grow in
popularity. 212 This entity, the limited liability company ("LLC"), was designed
by states to combine the most beneficial attribute of the partnership form
(single level of taxation) with the most beneficial attribute of the corporate
form (limited liability). 213 The LLC statutes also generally allowed owners the
flexibility to choose among the less important corporate factors of centralized
management, free transferability of interests, and perpetual existence.2 14
Importantly, because these statutes allowed a particular entity to fail at least
208 See I.R.C. § 7704(b).
209 See id.
210 See id; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-495, at 943-45 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1245, 2313-1689 to 2313-1690; H.R. REP. No. 100-391(11), pt. B(l), at
1063-67 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-378, 2313-678 to 2313-682
(discussing the corporate resemblance standard and recognizing that § 7704 would apply to
publicly traded entities that otherwise would be classified as partnerships under such
standard).
211 See I.R.C. § 7704(a) (automatically classifying publicly traded partnerships as
corporations).
212 See Hobbs, supra note 194, at 515-17 (describing the proliferation of the limited
liability company after the IRS issued Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 360-61, which
classified a limited liability company formed under Wyoming law as a partnership for
federal income tax purposes).
213 See GEORGE MUNDSTOCK, A UNIFIED APPROACH TO SUBCHAPTERS K & S 10 (2002)
(observing that "[t]he LLC provides the single-tax and tax loss pass-through benefits of
[partnerships] with limited state-law liability"); Hobbs, supra note 194, at 510
(characterizing LLCs as combining "the limited liability of corporations with the tax aspects
of partnerships").
214 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233, 235-36 (describing a Delaware statute
that allowed owners to opt-in to the secondary corporate characteristics of free transfer-
ability, continuity of life, and centralized management); see also 1 BITTKER & EUSTICE,
supra note 3, 2.05[2], at 2-34 ("LLC statutes often create choices to be exercised in the
LLC's organizing agreement.").
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two of these secondary corporate attributes, they ensured that, with proper
planning, the entity would not be classified as an association under the Kintner
Regulations. 215
As a result, by using the LLC form, any non-publicly traded business could
combine pass-through taxation, limited liability, and one of the secondary
corporate characteristics. Furthermore, because the two forgone secondary
corporate characteristics were generally insignificant to a closely held
business, 2 16 the LLC allowed owners to easily accommodate all of their
important goals.21 7
Like the publicly traded partnership, the LLC highlighted the inadequacies
of the corporate resemblance test, this time in the non-publicly traded context.
Closely held LLCs looked and behaved in all important respects like closely
held corporations yet were taxed differently because of relatively insignificant
distinctions. Recognizing this and tiring of the perpetual classification battles
with taxpayers, the Treasury finally capitulated in 1996 with the promulgation
of the "check-the-box" regulations. 218
III. ANALYSIS OF THE VALIDITY OF THE CHECK-THE-BOX REGULATIONS
The check-the-box regulations, which became effective on January 1,
1997,219 marked the apparent end of the corporate resemblance test. These
regulations provided that, for purposes of § 7701(a)(3), any unincorporated
business entity generally could elect whether or not to be classified as an
association, 220 unless it was a publicly traded partnership covered by § 7704.221
Therefore, after the promulgation of these regulations, a non-publicly traded,
unincorporated business could generally elect whether or not to be subject to
215 See I BITTKER & EusTICE, supra note 3, 2.05[2], at 2-34 (explaining that state
statues allow LLCs to plan to be classified as either partnerships or associations for tax
purposes). Some statutes were designed to be fool-proof in ensuring non-association status
by preventing the LLC from having more than two corporate characteristics. See, e.g.,
Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-122 to -123 (Michie
2003) (ensuring that Wyoming LLCs would lack the corporate characteristics of continuity
of life and free transferability).
216 See Hobbs, supra note 194, at 514 (explaining that the owners of closely held
businesses generally did not care about continuity of life or free transferability of interests).
217 See id.
218 61 Fed. Reg. 66584, 66584-85 (Dec. 18, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1,
301, 602) (summarizing regulations providing a generally elective system for classifying
business organizations effective January 1, 1997).
219 Id. at 66584.
220 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2001).
221 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(7). In addition, certain foreign entities, such as the
Mexican Sociedad Anonima, are treated as per se corporations under the regulations. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(8) (listing entities in eighty jurisdictions that are automatically
regarded as corporations). The regulations also provide default rules that classify entities in
the absence of an affirmative election. See infra text accompanying notes 318-321.
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the corporate tax.
The regulations were praised from the beginning. The leading corporate tax
treatise remarked that the regulations "were concise, clear, and surprisingly
simple ... and they were happily embraced by tax practitioners with near
unanimity. ' 222 The prestigious Tax Section of the New York State Bar
Association called the elective regime a "bold and innovative proposal that
would avoid the substantial expenditure of resources on entity classification
issues that is required of both taxpayers and the government under the
traditional four-factor test. '223 Lost in this overwhelming praise, however, was
any serious discussion of whether the regulations' elective methodology was
foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey.
A. The Validity of the Regulations under a Chevron Analysis
From the outset, the government was concerned about whether the Treasury
had the authority to issue these regulations. For example, when the IRS first
raised the possibility of an elective regime, it requested public commentary
regarding the appropriateness of implementing it via regulatory action.224
Although there was not unanimity, the clear consensus was that the Treasury
had the requisite authority. As discussed below, however, the commentators
focused exclusively on the regulations' validity under the Chevron two step
methodology, failing to recognize that, because of the incorporation rule, that
analysis was misplaced and irrelevant.
1. Arguments Made Against Validity
Among the commentary, the distinct minority view was that the Treasury
lacked authority to promulgate the regulations. The basis for this view was
that the statutory language itself, rather than Morrissey, foreclosed any
possibility of an elective regime. Thus, these arguments were all grounded in
Chevron step one in that they were premised on the idea that Congress had
specifically ruled out an elective regime.
Although all of the arguments for invalidity were based on plain meaning,
the formulations of the argument differed slightly among commentators. Some
argued that an elective regime was simply foreclosed by the statutory language
in § 7701 (a)(3), which indicated that Congress intended the term "association"
to have substantive meaning.225 Others argued that the statutory scheme in
222 1 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 3, 2.02[3][a], at 2-13.
223 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on the "Check the Box" Entity
Classification System Proposed in Notice 95-14, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 5, 1995,
available at LEXIS 95 TNT 147-46 [hereinafter NY State Bar Report].
224 I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-1 C.B. 297, 299.
225 See Susan Pace Hamill, A Case for Eliminating the Partnership Regulations, 68 TAX
NOTES 335, 337 n.15 (July 17, 1995), available at LEXIS 68 TN 335 (arguing that, because
the Code "defin[es] 'corporation' to include 'associations'[, it] clearly contemplates that at
least some unincorporated organizations will be classified as associations and subject to the
[Vol. 84:185
2004] VALIDITY OF THE "CHECK-THE-BOX" REGULATIONS 223
§§ 7701(a)(2) and (a)(3), which define "corporation" and "partnership" as
mutually exclusive, mandated that two entities which are identical in all
substantive respects may not be classified inconsistently.2 2 6
2. Arguments Made in Favor of Validity
The vast majority of commentators found the regulations to be
permissible.227  In general, these commentators concluded that the term
"association" had no plain meaning under Chevron step one22 8 and then
corporate tax provisions"); Philip F. Postlewaite & John S. Pennell, JCT's Partnership Tax
Proposals-'Houston, We Have a Problem', 76 TAx NOTES 527, 532 (July 28, 1997),
available at LEXIS 76 TN 527 (concluding that "it appears irrefutable that implicit in the
statutory formulation is that the taxpayer... is not entitled to determine the enterprise's
classification by a mere expression of preference").
226 See 1 McKEE ET AL., supra note 1, 3.08, at 3-102 (suggesting that Treasury
exceeded its authority when it promulgated "a rule that permits substantively identical
entities to elect to be classified as either an association taxable as a corporation or a
partnership").
227 See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Taxation, Comments on Notice 95-14, 1995-14
J.R.B. 7, Proposed Revisions to the Entity Classification Rules, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 26,
1995, available at LEXIS 95 TNT 145-25 [hereafter Tax Section Report]; Ass'n of the Bar
of the City of N.Y., Comm. on Taxation of Partnerships and Other Pass-Through Entities,
Report on "Check-the-Box" Proposal for Entity Classification (Notice 95-14), TAX NOTES
TODAY, Aug. 24, 1995, available at LEXIS 95 TNT 166-43 [hereinafter Bar of NYC
Report]; NY State Bar Report, supra note 223; see also Victor E. Fleischer, Note, "If It
Looks Like a Duck": Corporate Resemblance and Check-the-Box Elective Tax
Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 518, 532-37 (1996).
228 See, e.g., Bar of NYC Report, supra note 227 (maintaining that because the Code does
not define the term "association," it gives Treasury authority to define the term); NY State
Bar Report, supra note 223 (arguing that because the terms "association" and "partnership"
are not defined in the tax code, the Treasury has regulatory authority to define those terms
and implement the check-the-box system); see also Fleischer, supra note 227, at 535
(concluding that the check-the-box regulations survive step one because the term
"association" lacks plain meaning). This application of Chevron step one (asking whether
the term at issue has a plain meaning) is a narrow view of that step. See Levin, supra note
37, at 1283. In step one, Chevron asked whether Congress has "directly addressed the
precise question at issue." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984). A broader view of step one, and the one used by the commentators who
argued that the check-the-box regulations were invalid, would formulate the "precise
question at issue" as whether Congress had ruled out the interpretation proffered by the
agency. See Levin, supra note 37, at 1283 (predicting that if one frames the "'precise
question at issue' as whether Congress has ruled out an option the agency has chosen, the
stage may be set for reversal at step one"). The Supreme Court has occasionally framed the
step one inquiry in this broad manner. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511
U.S. 328, 339 (1994) (finding Congress ruled out exempting Chicago's use of an ash
incinerator from hazardous waste regulation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1988) (holding
Congress ruled out more restrictive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor in the
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
determined that the elective regime was reasonable under step two. 22 9
In concluding that the regulations survived step two, proponents of the
regulations generally made one of two arguments. Some proponents argued
that the corporate resemblance test as clarified by the Kintner Regulations had
effectively become an elective regime; therefore, according to these
proponents, the regulations were merely "a change in form rather than in
substance. '230 This point is dubious, as explained by Philip Postlewaite and
John Pennell, who noted, "If the prior classification system was truly elective,
then what need was there for the new regulations? If not, then the check-the-
box approach is an alteration of the classification system." 231 Simply put,
under the corporate resemblance test, an unincorporated entity with more than
two of the substantive corporate characteristics could not avoid corporate
treatment. Under the check-the-box regime, this was now possible.23
2
Accordingly, contrary to the arguments of these proponents, the check-the-box
regulations did substantively change the classification test.
Other proponents conceded that the regulations made a substantive change,
but argued that the policy choice made by Treasury was reasonable and
therefore permissible under Chevron.233 These commentators argued that,
when viewed in conjunction with the publicly traded partnership provision in
§ 7704, the regulations constituted a reasonable implementation of the
Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445-48
(1987) (holding that two standards through which an alien may seek relief in the
Immigration and Nationality Act are distinct despite interpretation of Board of Immigration
Appeals that they are equivalent). Because the narrow view will often result in the court
moving on to lenient step two, this view would also increase the likelihood of the court
upholding the agency interpretation. See Levin, supra note 37, at 1282 (observing that,
where the court has used the narrow view of step one, it "[u]sually. . . leads to affirmance of
the agency's action").
229 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 227, at 549 (concluding that the regulations implement
the congressional mandate in a reasonable manner).
230 JCT REPORT, supra note 12, at 15. See also Tax Section Report, supra note 227
(concluding that the regulations would be valid because under the Kintner Regulations,
"taxpayers [could] in effect, elect whether to have their business enterprises classified as
corporations or partnerships .. "); Bar of NYC Report, supra note 227 (concluding that the
regulations would be valid because the pre-check-the-box regime "in effect[] already
provide an election"); NY State Bar Report, supra note 223 (arguing that because the
regulations would "codify the effectively elective nature of the current classification system,
as well as reduce burdens on taxpayers and the government,... the Treasury has the
authority to promulgate such regulations").
231 Postlewaite & Pennell, supra note 225, at 531 n.36.
232 See State Bar of Cal. Taxation Section, "Check the Box" Elective Partnership
Taxation and Reduced Cost Entity Conversions: A Proposal for Simplicity and Horizontal
Equity, TAx NOTES TODAY, July 28, 1995, available at LEXIS 95 TNT 147-41 (observing
that under pre-check-the-box law, an LLC could not have all four corporate characteristics
and qualify for flow-through tax treatment).
233 See JCT REPORT, supra note 12, at 14-15; Fleischer, supra note 227, at 544-49.
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congressional mandate in § 7701(a)(3) that corporate-like entities be taxed as
corporations.2 34 Commentators supporting this view observed that, under a
check-the-box regime, only publicly traded entities would generally be subject
to the corporate tax because closely held organizations would almost always
elect partnership classification. 235 As a result, the argument went, the check-
the-box regulations merely "shift the focus of the resemblance test to the
pivotal factor of whether an unincorporated organization is publicly traded. 236
Furthermore, according to these commentators, using public trading as a proxy
for "corporateness" is a wise policy choice. 237
The argument that public trading should, as a policy matter, be the
distinguishing feature in determining whether an entity should be subject to the
corporate tax has a good deal of merit.238  It remains difficult, if not
impossible, however, to reconcile this notion with the statute because the
regulations interpret the statutory term "association" as devoid of any
substantive meaning.2 39 Even though § 7704 in effect automatically treats
publicly traded partnerships as associations, when Congress enacted the
provision, it left the historical definition of corporation as including
"associations" intact.240 By leaving this definition untouched in the process of
radically changing the classification landscape, Congress indicated a clear
intention that entities other than publicly traded partnerships and state-law
corporations be treated as corporations for tax purposes. Thus, even though
the regulations may represent a reasonable or even wise policy choice, it
appears difficult to square them with the language of § 7701 (a)(3).
Nevertheless, since this article argues that one never even gets to Chevron
because of Morrissey and the incorporation rule, it is not necessary to resolve
the question of whether the check-the-box regulations would survive a
Chevron analysis. Accordingly, even though there are very strong arguments
that the regulations would not survive a Chevron analysis, for the remainder of
this article it is assumed that the regulations would be upheld under Chevron
had they been issued on a clean slate.24 1
234 See JCT REPORT, supra note 12 at 15-16; Fleischer, supra note 227, at 544-49.
235 See Fleischer, supra note 227, at 542.
236 See id. at 522.
237 See id. at 549-55.
238 See id. at 553-55 (arguing that using public trading is wise because it will not
significantly decrease the corporate tax base, it will simplify the law, and it will bring tax
law more in line with securities law). In fact, because the check-the-box regulations have
remained in effect since 1997, the publicly traded distinction is the one that has been in
place since then. There has been no discussion about terminating the elective regime, which
supports the notion that the publicly traded distinction has survived the test of time thus far.
239 See supra text accompanying note 225 (observing that Congress intended
"association" to have substantive meaning in § 7701(a)(3)).
240 See supra text accompanying notes 206-210.
241 By using the term "issued on a clean slate," I mean if the regulations were issued in
the absence of Morrissey or any other judicial interpretation of the term "association."
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B. Appropriate Analysis of the Validity of the Check-the-Box Regulations
Despite the Treasury's initial concern about the validity of the check-the-
box regulations and the voluminous commentary devoted to the issue, the
incorporation rule has never been discussed with regard to the regulations.
Although a few commentators briefly alluded to the general notion that
Morrissey's interpretation of association might foreclose an elective regime, 242
none of the trilogy of cases underlying the incorporation rule were ever cited or
discussed. 243 This failure is particularly striking given the importance of the
regulations, the wealth of commentary on the regulations, and the identity of
those who specifically commented on the regulations' validity, including the
Joint Committee on Taxation and the tax sections of the New York and
California state bar associations.
1. Application of the Incorporation Rule
Applying the incorporation rule to the check-the-box regulations is
relatively straightforward. In Morrissey, the Supreme Court independently
interpreted the term "association" to mean any unincorporated entity that
242 See, e.g., JCT REPORT, supra note 12, at 15 ("Some might argue that the Morrissey
decision requires the Treasury Department to apply a corporate resemblance test in any
regulations for determining whether an entity is an association taxable as a corporation.");
NY State Bar Report, supra note 223 (arguing that although it believes the regulations to be
valid, "it is possible to construct an argument that Treasury does not have the authority to
adopt the 'check the box' system by way of regulation, which argument would rely on the
fact that the four-factor test is grounded in the early case law that purports to classify based
upon corporate resemblance."); see also William B. Brannan, The Subchapter K Reform Act
of 1997, 75 TAX NoTEs 121, 141 n.106 (Apr. 7, 1997), available at LEXIS 75 TN 121
(explaining that while he "is alarmed about the suggestion" that the regulations might be
invalid, the "principal argument [in favor of invalidity] would be that the corporate
resemblance approach reflected in the prior regulations were [sic] grounded in established
case law beginning with... Morrissey ... and, therefore, the Treasury Department could
not now fundamentally change the classification law by adopting new regulations"); Hamill,
supra note 225, at 337 n.15 (arguing that the regulations are invalid because they
"eliminat[e] the relevance of the corporate resemblance test, [thereby] completely
overtum[ing] the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 7701 (a)(3) that has been in force
for 60 years"). Notably, Professor Hamill was the only commentator to definitively
conclude that the regulations would be invalid on the grounds that they conflict with
Morrissey, although she did not cite the cases underlying the incorporation rule in support of
her position.
243 All of the commentary except for the Joint Committee on Taxation's was published
before Neal, the last case in the trilogy, was decided on January 22, 1996. See Neal v.
United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996). All of the commentary, however, was published well
after the second case of the trilogy, Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, was decided on January 27,
1992. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992). The Joint Committee's report,
which specifically and extensively discussed the issue of whether the regulations were valid,
was published on April 8, 1997, well after the Neal decision. See JCT REPORT, supra note
12, at 13-17.
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sufficiently resembled a corporation and instructed that, in determining
resemblance, the four corporate characteristics were to be analyzed. 244 This
definition was the result of an independent judicial interpretation made after "a
further examination of the congressional intent";245 it was not made in
deference to the government's position, which was explicitly rejected by the
Court.
2 46
Under the incorporation rule, the Supreme Court definition effectively
became part of the governing statute, at least until the Court overrules its
precedent or Congress amends the statute.247 The check-the-box regulations,
which allow an entity that has all four corporate characteristics to avoid
association status, are inconsistent with the Morrissey definition, which would
classify such an entity as an association. Because of this inconsistency and
because Congress has not amended the definition of corporation in
§ 7701 (a)(3), the regulations are invalid.
2. Possible Counter-Arguments
There are five colorable arguments that could be made in an attempt to save
the regulations from invalidity, but all are ultimately unpersuasive. These
arguments are discussed below, beginning with two made by the Joint
Committee on Taxation.
a. Consistency with Morrissey
The Joint Committee made the following argument in response to the
general notion that Morrissey might foreclose an elective regime:
Some might argue that the Morrissey decision requires the Treasury De-
partment to apply a corporate resemblance test in any regulations for de-
termining whether an entity is an association taxable as a corporation. On
the other hand, it has been argued that the check-the-box regulations in
fact represent an implementation of the corporate resemblance test, when
viewed in conjunction with the present-law rules generally treating pub-
licly traded partnerships as corporations. The publicly traded partnership
rules could be viewed as reflecting a determination by Congress that pub-
lic trading is an effective index of whether an entity resembles a corpora-
tion.248
This argument appears to be based on the view that the check-the-box regime
244 See supra text accompanying notes 176-179 (identifying the four factors to be
applied).
245 Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 356 (1935).
246 See supra text accompanying notes 172-179 (observing that Morrissey rejected the
business enterprise test that the governing regulation used and that was the basis of the
government's argument that the trust constituted an association).
247 See supra text accompanying notes 92-101.
248 JCT REPORT, supra note 12, at 15-16 (footnotes omitted).
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is not inconsistent with the holding in Morrissey. Under this view, the check-
the-box regime merely changes the "index" of corporate resemblance from the
four-factor test to public trading.
This argument is unpersuasive regardless of whether one takes an expansive
or narrow view of Morrissey's holding. Under a broad view, Morrissey
instructed a reviewing court to analyze the four identified corporate factors, 249
which is clearly inconsistent with the check-the-box regime under which these
factors are irrelevant. 250 In other words, Morrissey explicitly provided the
index of corporate resemblance and any change of that index is inconsistent
with this broad view. of Morrissey's holding.
Under a narrow view, the Court held that an unincorporated business entity
with all four corporate characteristics constitutes an association.25' This is also
inconsistent with the check-the-box regime where such an entity would be able
to elect its classification.252 Therefore, under the check-the-box regulations,
the actual outcome in Morrissey would have been different. Accordingly,
when viewed from either a broad or narrow perspective, the holding of
Morrissey is incompatible with an elective regime.
b. Super-Chevron Powers in Entity Classification?
In addressing the concern that Morrissey might foreclose an elective regime,
the Joint Committee noted that "the standard of review articulated in the
Morrissey case... grant[s] the Treasury Department considerable leeway to
devise a different [classification] test, '253 citing the following language from
Morrissey:
As the statute merely provided the term "corporation" should include "as-
sociations," without further definition, the Treasury department was au-
thorized to supply rules for the enforcement of the Act within the permis-
sible bounds of administrative construction. Nor can this authority be
deemed to be so restricted that the regulations, once issued, could not
later be clarified or enlarged so as to meet administrative exigencies or
conform tojudicial decision.254
Other proponents of the regulations also suggested that this language gave the
Treasury extremely broad latitude, a sort of "super-Chevron" power, in
developing classification tests. 255
249 See Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 359.
250 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2003) (allowing unincorporated
entities to elect their classification).
251 See Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 360-61.
252 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (allowing unincorporated entities to elect their
classifications).
253 JCT Report, supra note 12, at 16.
254 Id. at 16 n.27 (quoting Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 354-55 (1935) (emphasis
added)).
255 See, e.g., Tax Section Report, supra note 227 (arguing that this language gives "the
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These commentators, however, read this language entirely out of context. In
the excerpt above, the Court was specifically responding to the trust's
argument that the Treasury's old regulatory standard, pursuant to which the
trust would be treated as an association only if the beneficiaries had control
over the corpus, was binding on the government. 256 The Court was simply
explaining that the Treasury was not bound by its superceded regulations. The
Court was not addressing the different and much more radical notion that the
Treasury could, in the course of issuing a new regulation, disregard a prior
Supreme Court decision directly on point. As a result, this language does not
support the validity of the regulations.
c. Alternatives to the Incorporation Rule
A proponent of the check-the-box regulations might also argue that the
Court should overrule the trilogy of cases underlying the incorporation rule.
As previously discussed, the incorporation rule undermines the Chevron
principle that politically accountable agencies, rather than politically insulated
judges, should bear primary interpretative responsibility with regard to
ambiguous agency-administered statutes. 25 7 Furthermore, the rule restricts the
flexibility granted by Chevron, which allows agencies to deal with changed
circumstances. 258 In addition to undermining Chevron, the incorporation rule
places undue importance on timing,259 which itself creates improper incentives
for both agencies2 60 and courts. 261
As a result, some have suggested that the incorporation rule should be
overruled judicially in favor of a different methodology for resolving the
conflict between stare decisis and Chevron. Two approaches have recently
been discussed.
i. Re-Examination Approach
Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman have discussed the conflict between
stare decisis and Chevron in cases where a pre-Chevron judicial interpretation
conflicts with a later Mead-qualified agency interpretation. 262 They considered
Treasury... broad latitude to promulgate regulations in this area"); Tax Executives Inst.,
Inc., Comments of Tax Executives Institute, Inc. on Notice 95-14 Relating to Entity
Classification, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 28, 1995, available at LEXIS 95 TNT 147-41
(arguing that the language "confirms Treasury's authority to amend the regulations 'to meet
administrative exigencies').
256 See supra text accompanying notes 168-170 (finding that the Revenue Act of 1924
did not bind Treasury to its previous regulations regarding the definition of association).
257 Supra text accompanying notes 108-109.
258 Supra text accompanying note 110.
259 Supra text accompanying notes 111-113.
260 See supra text accompanying notes 117-119.
261 See supra text accompanying notes 120-121.
262 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 40, at 915-20.
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"the need for a transitional rule-a special rule of adjustment that mediates
between the pre-Chevron and the post-Chevron worlds. 263
There are really only two options for [pre-Chevron] decisions. One is to
examine each pre-Chevron precedent on a case-by-case basis, in an at-
tempt to determine as best as is possible whether the precedent would
have been a step-one precedent or a step-two precedent if, counterfactu-
ally, the court had applied the Chevron doctrine. The other is to adopt a
blanket presumption that all pre-Chevron precedent is step-one prece-
dent.... The Supreme Court's treatment of its own precedent is best un-
derstood as adopting the second option-the blanket presumption that all
past Supreme Court precedents are step-one precedents. 264
In Merrill and Hickman's terminology, the incorporation rule can be
understood as "a blanket presumption that all pre-Chevron [Supreme Court]
precedent is step-one precedent. '265 Branding this precedent automatically as
step one precedent has the same effect as treating the judicial interpretation as
incorporated into the statute because the agency would be similarly bound in
either case. 266 Applying this blanket step one approach, the check-the-box
regulations would be invalid since they are inconsistent with the Court's
deemed step one interpretation of the term "association."
The result is the same even under Merrill and Hickman's re-examination of
the pre-Chevron precedent approach. Applying this approach to Morrissey,
one would re-examine the opinion to best determine whether the case
"correspond[s] to either step one or step two of Chevron. '267 This is another
way of asking whether the case would fall under the independent judgment
model (where the court independently determined the meaning of the term) or
the deferential model (where the court deferred to any reasonable agency
263 Id. at 916.
264 Id. at 917. Merrill and Hickman do not address the similar conflict that arises when a
judicial interpretation that was made post-Chevron (but without the benefit of a Mead-
qualified agency interpretation) is inconsistent with a later Mead-qualified interpretation.
See Bamberger, supra note 18, at 1296-1301. Rather, they focused only on the transitional
issue of how to treat a pre-Chevron judicial interpretation in a post-Chevron world. See
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 40, at 917.
265 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 40, at 917.
266 There might be a slight difference between these two approaches with regard to the
Court's willingness to overrule its prior interpretation. It is unclear, under Merrill and
Hickman's blanket step one presumption, how the Court would decide whether to overrule
its precedent.
267 Id. at 918. Although the language quoted in the text accompanying note 264, supra,
might suggest that the re-examination approach would require the Court to speculate as to
what the pre-Chevron court actually would have done had it applied Chevron, it is clear that
this is not what Merrill and Hickman suggest. Rather, under the re-examination approach,
the pre-Chevron decision is analyzed closely to determine whether it better corresponds with
step one or step two under Chevron. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 40, at 918.
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definition).268 As previously discussed, the Court in Morrissey rejected the
government's view and independently interpreted the statutory language at
issue. 269 As a result, even under this re-examination approach, the check-the-
box regulations would be invalid.270
ii. Provisional Precedent Approach
Kenneth Bamberger recently proposed a more radical alternative to the
incorporation rule. 2 7 1 To address the problems resulting from the incorporation
rule, Bamberger proposed giving judicial interpretations of ambiguous agency-
administered statutes only provisional stare decisis effect.272  Under this
approach, when Congress leaves ambiguity to agency discretion, "a judicial
choice of one option within the zone of indeterminacy, although it would be
authoritative in resolving the case or controversy, would constitute binding
precedent only until an agency puts forth a different one in a manner deserving
Chevron treatment. '273 In other words, a rule of provisional precedent would
allow a Mead-qualified agency interpretation to trump a judicial interpretation
so long as the agency interpretation would be upheld under Chevron.274
If the Court adopted Bamberger's proposal of provisional precedent, the
validity of check-the-box regulations would be analyzed very differently.
Morrissey, because it acknowledged that the term "association" was
ambiguous, 275 would be considered provisional precedent subject to
subsequent Mead-qualified Treasury action that passes the Chevron
standard.276 Therefore, assuming that the check-the-box regulations were
issued in a form that qualifies for Chevron deference under Mead,277 the
268 See supra Part I.A.
269 See supra text accompanying notes 162-179.
270 Merrill and Hickman ultimately support the blanket step one presumption as the best
transition rule, concluding that the benefits of the re-examination approach would be
outweighed by its difficulties and inefficiencies. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 40, at
918-20.
271 Bamberger, supra note 18, at 1310-20 (outlining provisional precedent analysis).
272 Id. at 1310-11.
273 Id. at 1311.
274 Id.
275 Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U.S. 344, 356 (1935).
276 By acknowledging that the term was ambiguous, Morrissey leaves the Treasury the
opportunity to amend the judicial interpretation by regulation under a rule of provisional
precedent. See Bamberger, supra note 18, at 1310-11. If the Court had found plain
meaning in Morrissey, then a subsequent inconsistent Treasury regulation would be invalid
even under this rule not because it conflicted with judicial precedent, but because it
conflicted with the plain meaning of the statute (as previously determined by the Court)
under Chevron step one. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
277 See supra Part I.E.3 (discussing whether general authority regulations qualify for
Chevron deference under Mead).
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regulations would be upheld if they pass Chevron's two step analysis.278
Accordingly, if the Court adopted a rule of provisional precedent, the
regulations might be saved. While a full analysis of Bamberger's proposal is
beyond the scope of this article, it is enough to say that it is unlikely to be
adopted by the Court in the near term simply because it would represent "a
landmark abdication of judicial power. '279 In this regard, Justice Scalia notes:
I know of no case, in the entire history of the federal courts, in which we
have allowed a judicial interpretation of a statute to be set aside by an
agency--or have allowed a lower court to render an interpretation of a
statute subject to correction by an agency.280
Indeed, "there would be something unsettling about a world in which executive
branch administrators could 'overrule' Supreme Court decisions. 2 81
d. Overruling Morrissey
A proponent of the check-the-box regulations might argue that the Court
should overrule its holding in Morrissey. This is a difficult argument to win,
given the Court's well-established reluctance to overruling its statutory
interpretation precedents. 282
In discussing the merits of this strategy, it should first be noted that the
context for this argument (i.e., that the Court should overrule its own statutory
interpretation precedent) would be quite unusual. A party generally makes this
argument by requesting that the Court strike down the old interpretation and
adopt a new, alternative judicial interpretation.283 In this case, however, a
proponent of the check-the-box regulations would be arguing for the Court
merely to strike down the old precedent; the proponent would not ask the Court
to adopt a new judicial interpretation. Rather, the proponent would ask the
Court to leave the Treasury space to operate. 284 In other words, the proponent
278 See supra Part III.A (discussing whether the check-the-box regulations would be
upheld under a Chevron analysis).
279 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 248 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
280 Id. at 248-49.
281 Merrill, supra note 16, at 989.
282 See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1996); Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 699-700 (1992); Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197,
202 (1991); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (indicating that
stare decisis has special force in the statutory interpretation context); see also Eskridge,
supra note 89, at 1362-63 (describing the Court's "super-strong presumption of correctness"
with regard to its statutory interpretation precedents).
283 See, e.g., Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 699-700; Hilton, 502 U.S. at 202; Patterson, 491
U.S. at 172 (upholding earlier judicial interpretation despite arguments that the Court should
adopt a different interpretation).
284 One might wonder whether the proponent could ask the Court to overrule Morrissey
and then adopt the check-the-box regulations' definition of association. The regulations'
elective regime, however, involves a highly bureaucratic process. For example, the
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would be asking the Court to wipe the slate clean, thereby allowing the Mead-
qualified check-the-box regulations to stand.
It is unclear whether this different context would make it more or less likely
for the Court to take the unusual step of overruling its own precedent. On the
one hand, in this context the agency charged with administering the statute has
spoken in a formal Mead-qualified manner, concluding that a different
interpretation would be best. 285 Because of this expert opinion, and perhaps in
the interest of inter-branch comity, this unusual context might cause the Court
to be more receptive than usual to the argument that it should overrule its
statutory interpretation precedent.
On the other hand, the Court might be offended by an agency's brazenness
in so clearly contradicting an existing Supreme Court precedent directly on
point.286 In such a case, the Court might desire to send a strong message to the
executive branch that such tactics will not result in a successful end run around
the general rule that agencies must go to Congress to change settled law. The
Court could send such a message by summarily refusing an invitation to
reconsider its precedent in this context, thereby forcing the agency to turn to
Congress.
In what appears to be the only case in which the issue arose in this context,
the Court rejected the argument that it should overrule its prior statutory
interpretation precedent. In the Neal case discussed earlier, 287 the defendant
asked the Court to reconsider its precedent holding in Chapman v. United
regulations specify the time, place, and method for filing the classification election with the
IRS. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c). Because of this bureaucratic process, it is difficult to
see how the Court itself could reinterpret the term association as the regulations do.
285 See Pierce, supra note 41, at 2260 (suggesting that in this context, the Court "should
use the occasion of the announcement of the agency construction as an indication of the
need to reconsider the precedent").
286 See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948). The
Court maintained:
[I]f the President may completely disregard the judgment of the court, it would be only
because it is one the courts were not authorized to render. Judgments within the pow-
ers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be re-
vised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government.
Id. Cf City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) ("When the political branches of
the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution
already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat
its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and
contrary expectations must be disappointed.").
287 See supra text accompanying notes 95-99. In the other two cases in the incorporation
rule trilogy, the Court, in deciding that the agency action was foreclosed by its precedent
holding, did not extensively address the argument that it should overrule the precedent. In
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the Court did not address the argument at all. 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
In Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., the Court very briefly addressed the
argument, stating in a conclusory manner that "Congress has not diverged from [the Court's
prior] interpretation and we decline to revisit it ourselves." 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990).
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States288 that, in calculating the amount of a "mixture or substance" of LSD for
criminal sentencing purposes, the actual weight of blotter paper was to be
counted. 289 The defendant, however, did not request that the Court adopt a
new judicial interpretation; rather the defendant asked the Court to defer to the
position of the United States Sentencing Commission that every dose of LSD
on any carrier medium would automatically be given a presumed weight of 0.4
milligrams. 290 The Court quickly disposed of the defendant's request that the
Court overrule its precedent:
Our reluctance to overturn precedents derives in part from institutional
concerns about the relationship of the Judiciary to Congress. One reason
that we give great weight to stare decisis in the area of statutory construc-
tion is that "Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its
legislation." We have overruled our precedents when the intervening de-
velopment of the law has "removed or weakened the conceptual under-
pinnings from the prior decision, or where the later law has rendered the
decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies." Ab-
sent those changes or compelling evidence bearing on Congress' original
intent, our system demands that we adhere to our prior interpretations of
statutes. Entrusted within its sphere to make policy judgments, the
Commission may abandon its old methods in favor of what it has deemed
a more desirable "approach" to calculating LSD quantities. We, however,
do not have the same latitude to forsake prior interpretations of a statute.
True, there may be little in logic to defend the statute's treatment of LSD;
it results in significant disparity of punishment meted out to LSD offend-
ers relative to other narcotics traffickers .... Even so, Congress, not this
Court, has the responsibility for revising its statutes. Were we to alter our
statutory interpretations from case to case, Congress would have less rea-
son to exercise its responsibility to correct statutes that are thought to be
unwise or unfair.29'
The Neal Court, while acknowledging that Chapman was probably unwise
from a policy perspective, refused to reconsider the decision in the absence of
either (1) an intervening development in the law that had "removed or
weakened [the prior decision's] conceptual underpinnings" or "rendered [it]
irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies" or (2) the emergence
of "compelling evidence bearing on Congress' original intent. '292 Neal also
explained that the basis for the Court's reluctance to overrule its statutory
precedents is the recognition that Congress is free to change any interpretation
288 500 U.S. 453, 455 (1991).
289 Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1996).
290 Id. at 289.
291 Id. at 295-96 (citations omitted).
292 Id. at 295 (internal quotations omitted).
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of which it does not approve. 293 In addition, the Neal Court was concerned
that frequent reconsideration of statutory precedents would reduce the
incentive for Congress to amend statutes that it considers unsatisfactory. 294
A similar analysis of the Morrissey decision leads to the conclusion that it,
like Chapman, should not be overruled. Since there has been no new evidence
bearing on Congress's original intent with regard to its use of the term
"association," the only remaining issue under Neal is whether there has been
an "intervening development of the law, through either the growth of judicial
doctrine or further action taken by Congress," 295 that might affect the
continuing vitality of Morrissey.
Intervening developments in law actually support, rather than undermine,
the vitality of Morrissey. In 1987, over fifty years after Morrissey, Congress
enacted § 7704 against the classification backdrop created by the Morrissey
Court.296  This enactment, the most recent legislative action in the
classification area, by its text governs only partnerships, which were then
defined through the application of the corporate resemblance test.297 Thus,
Morrissey is the foundation on which § 7704 was built, and as a result, the
enactment of this section indicates congressional approval of the corporate
resemblance test.298
Therefore, it seems that intervening developments in law (i.e., the enactment
of § 7704) actually serve to ratify the corporate resemblance test created by
Morrissey. A proponent of the check-the-box regulations might argue,
however, that intervening developments in state law since the enactment of
§ 7704, namely the advent of the LLC, undermine the vitality of Morrissey.
According to this argument, the popularity of the LLC essentially made
Morrissey obsolete, since non-publicly traded entities could manipulate the
four factors to their satisfaction. This, however, is not a change in the law that
weakens Morrissey's conceptual underpinnings. Rather, the proliferation of
LLCs, like the proliferation of publicly traded partnerships that triggered the
enactment of § 7704, is a change in facts, and a change in facts is insufficient
293 Id.
294 Id. at 296.
295 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989).
296 See supra text accompanying notes 206-207.
297 Id.
298 The building block nature of Morrissey with regard to § 7704 is confirmed by
§ 7704's legislative history. This legislative history extensively discusses the corporate
resemblance test created by Morrissey. See authorities cited supra note 210. Section 7704
supports the vitality of Morrissey in another way. In enacting § 7704, Congress drastically
altered the classification landscape by taxing publicly traded partnerships as per se
corporations for the first time. See supra text accompanying notes 200-205. In making
such a drastic change, however, Congress did not see fit to repeal the corporate resemblance
test. In leaving the corporate resemblance definition of "association" untouched in the
process of substantially altering the law of the tax classification of business entities,
Congress appeared to ratify the corporate resemblance test.
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to support a Court overruling its prior statutory interpretation.299 Congress is
charged with the responsibility of adapting settled law to new facts.
Overruling Morrissey would give Congress "less reason to exercise [this]
responsibility. '300
In summary, it is unlikely that the Court would overrule its interpretation in
Morrissey in order to validate the check-the-box regulations because Congress,
through subsequent legislative enactment of § 7704, appeared to ratify the
holding of Morrissey. As a result, the Court would likely conclude that only
Congress could dispose of the corporate resemblance test.
30
e. Ratification of the Regulations by Acquiescence
Because it has been over six years since the check-the-box regulations
became effective, one might argue that congressional inaction in the
classification area since that time indicates approval of the elective regime.
Under this view, congressional inaction indicates tacit acquiescence to the new
regime.
Scholars have generally been very skeptical of drawing inferences from
congressional inaction.302 As a result, this argument could be attacked from
that perspective. These arguments, however, are unnecessary because the
argument that congressional inaction ratifies the regulations by acquiescence
should fail on much simpler grounds.
First, the doctrine of legislative acquiescence is used by courts to uphold one
arguably plausible agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute instead of
adopting a different, arguably more plausible judicial interpretation. 30 3 It
cannot be used to uphold an agency interpretation that the statute simply will
not bear. 30 4 Therefore, the doctrine of acquiescence does not allow Congress
299 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (stating that "an
intervening development of the law," not facts, is a basis for overruling statutory
interpretation precedent (emphasis added)). Cf Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (noting that changed factual circumstances may justify a
departure from precedent in the constitutional interpretation context).
300 Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 296 (1996).
31 See California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 499 (1990) (recognizing the respect the Court
"must accord to [its] longstanding and well-entrenched decisions, especially those
interpreting statutes that underlie complex regulatory regimes").
302 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 89, at 95-108 (questioning the ability to presume intent
from the collective inaction of Congress).
303 See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599-601 (1983) (attributing
significance to congressional inaction over the course of twelve years in the face of
numerous proposals to overturn an IRS interpretation of a prior statute).
314 See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 25 (1969) (concluding that "[w]hen a
regulation conflicts with the statute, the fact of subsequent re-enactment 'is immaterial, for
Congress could not add to or expand [the] statute by impliedly approving the regulation"'
(second alteration in the original) (quoting Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 93
(1959))); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 740, 759 (1931)
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to change the statute by inaction; 30 5 rather, it only allows Congress to confirm
a plausible interpretation of the statute by inaction.
The incorporation rule treats the Morrissey standard as though it is part of
the underlying statute. 30 6 Accordingly, using the acquiescence doctrine to
uphold a different standard would allow Congress to effectively change the
statute through inaction, an impermissible use of the doctrine.30 7
Second, it is unclear to which "law" Congress would be acquiescing. If a
legislator reviewed the state of the law immediately after the regulations were
issued, the legislator might conclude, as this article does, that the regulations
were invalid and that the Morrissey corporate resemblance test still controlled.
At the time the regulations were promulgated, the Court had just unanimously
confirmed in Neal that its interpretations trump subsequent agency
interpretations. 30 8 Accordingly, it then appeared that Morrissey remained
"good law." Therefore, if this legislator did nothing, one might conclude that
the legislator approved of this good law, not the invalid elective regime. This
second problem is related to the first problem because, in the usual case, the
upheld interpretation (i.e., a plausible interpretation) is not patently
unlawful.30 9
("Long continued practice and the approval of administrative authorities may be persuasive
in the interpretation of doubtful provisions of a statute, but cannot alter provisions that are
clear and explicit ....").
305 See Leary, 395 U.S. at 25 (concluding that Congress cannot change a statute through
inaction, by "impliedly approving" a regulation which contradicts the statute).
306 See supra Part III.B. 1.
301 See Biddle v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 573, 582 (1938) ("Where the law is plain the
subsequent re-enactment of a statute does not constitute adoption of its administrative
construction.").
308 See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (Jan. 22, 1996) ("Once we have
determined a statute's meaning, we adhere to our ruling under the doctrine of stare decisis,
and we assess an agency's later interpretation of the statute against that settled law."); 61
Fed. Reg. 66,584 (Dec. 18, 1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 301, 602) (finalizing
the check-the-box regulations).
309 In the usual case in which the acquiescence doctrine is applied, the Court is
considering whether to change one plausible interpretation of a statute by an agency to
another. See supra text accompanying note 303. In this context, a legislator reviewing the
statute after the initial interpretation might do nothing if he was satisfied with the
interpretation, believing that legislation was unnecessary because the issue had already been
settled. Accordingly, one could surmise from inaction that the legislator approved of the
initial interpretation. If, however, the initial interpretation was clearly invalid (because, for
example, it was incompatible with the statutory text), the implications of the inaction of a
legislator depend on the legislator's knowledge that the interpretation was invalid. If the
legislator knew the interpretation was invalid, he might do nothing if he disapproved of it,
knowing that a court would ultimately strike it down. If the legislator mistakenly thought
the interpretation was valid, he might do nothing if he approved of it, thinking that the
interpretation was now settled.
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IV. How COULD TREASURY HAVE ISSUED INVALID REGULATIONS?
This Part considers how the Treasury could have promulgated the check-
the-box regulations despite their invalidity in light of Morrissey. This action
by the Treasury is somewhat remarkable in two respects. First, the regulations
deal with an important and pervasive area of tax law that affects the
classification of almost every umincorporated business entity.310  The
regulations do not cover some arcane, technical area of tax law that affects
only a few taxpayers, where such an error might be understandable. Second,
the validity of the regulations was specifically highlighted as an issue when an
elective regime was first raised, and many distinguished commentators,
including the Joint Committee on Taxation 311 and the New York State Bar
Association Tax Section,312 specifically addressed the issue, but failed to
discuss the incorporation rule.
There are two possible explanations for the Treasury's action, although an
accurate explanation probably involves some combination of the two. These
possible explanations are discussed below.
A. Negligence and the Sociology of the Tax Community
One explanation could be pure ignorance of the incorporation rule on the
part of the tax community, which tends to have an unduly myopic vision of the
law.3 13 Professor Coverdale used this theory to explain why courts reviewing
tax regulations were so inconsistent in citing Chevron and using its two step
methodology, emphasizing the isolation of the highly specialized tax bar and
bench.3 14
Under this theory, the tax experts at the Treasury, IRS, and Joint Committee
on Taxation erroneously applied administrative law doctrine, jumping directly
to the question of whether the regulations would be upheld under Chevron
without adequately considering the impact of Morrissey. Likewise, under this
view, the private tax practitioners who specifically commented on the
regulations' validity merely got the administrative law wrong.
B. Intent and the Effect of Taxpayer Standing Doctrine
A more cynical explanation is that the Treasury was aware of the
regulations' invalidity yet issued them anyway because it severely discounted
310 See supra text accompanying notes 220-221.
311 See JCT REPORT, supra note 12, at 13-17.
312 See NY State Bar Report, supra note 223.
113 See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994) (observing that "tax law too often is
mistakenly viewed by lawyers, judges, and law professors as a self-contained body of law").
114 Coverdale, supra note 129, at 53-54 n.121 (hypothesizing that the "highly
specialized" nature of tax law leaves tax lawyers and judges either unaware of Chevron or
under the impression "that other doctrines are controlling in tax"); see also supra text
accompanying notes 136-144.
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the likelihood of any judicial challenge. Under this view, the Treasury
intentionally promulgated invalid regulations but determined that the
regulations were insulated from a challenge due the very restrictive taxpayer
standing doctrine discussed below. If, however, the Treasury had this
troubling view, it was short-sighted because, although a taxpayer with standing
to challenge the regulations might be hard to find, it is inevitable that such
taxpayers exist.
In general, taxpayers do not have standing in a suit that concerns someone
else's taxes because the relief sought would not benefit the taxpayer in any
tangible way. 315 In other words, a person does not have standing to challenge a
tax rule merely because of one's status as a taxpayer; rather, the person must
suffer a tangible injury in order to challenge the validity of a regulation.
Applying this taxpayer standing doctrine to the check-the-box regulations, a
taxpayer challenging the validity of the regulations would have to show that
his tax liability is higher under the regulations than under Morrissey's
corporate resemblance test. Because the check-the-box regulations allow an
entity to elect its classification, it might appear on first glance that all taxpayers
in all instances will fare no worse under the regulations than under Morrissey.
If this were the case, no one would have standing to challenge the regulations.
Although these regulations will generally work to the taxpayer's benefit (or at
least not to the taxpayer's detriment), there will be certain situations where the
taxpayer would be better off under the corporate resemblance test.316 One
could think of a number of such scenarios; three examples are provided below.
1. The Case of the Foreign Entity's Failure to Elect
Under the check-the-box regulations, eligible entities elect whether to be
classified as a corporation or a partnership by filing Form 8832 with the
IRS. 3 17 The regulations contain default rules that classify unincorporated
entities in the absence of an affirmative election. 3 18 The default rules classify
all domestic entities as partnerships,3 19 classify foreign entities that do not
provide limited liability for all of their owners as partnerships, 320 and classify
315 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923) (explaining that any statute
that produces additional taxes is "a matter of public and not of individual concern"); see
also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("I cannot now imagine a case, at least outside the First Amendment area, where a person
whose own tax liability was not affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax
liability of someone else."); BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS 51.10[4], at 51-58 to 51-60 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing standing barriers to
suits brought by plaintiffs concerning someone else's taxes).
316 1 MCKEE ET AL.,supra note 1, 3.08[1] n.421.
317 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1) (as amended in 2001).
318 See id. § 301.7701-3(b).
319 Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(1).
320 Id. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(A).
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foreign entities that do provide limited liability for all of their owners as
corporations. 32
1
Because partnership classification is generally desirable due to flow-through
taxation,322 the default rules that classify entities as partnerships are taxpayer-
favorable. Under these default rules, no entity will receive the generally less
desirable corporate classification unless it affirmatively elects otherwise.
323
With regard to foreign entities that provide limited liability for all of their
owners, however, the default rules are unfavorable. These entities will receive
the generally less desirable corporate classification if they fail to make an
affirmative election. 32
4
Accordingly, if one of these entities accidentally failed to elect partnership
status, it would have standing to challenge the regulations' validity if the
corporate resemblance test would have classified the entity as a partnership.
For example, assume that a foreign entity that provides all of its owners with
limited liability accidentally fails to elect partnership status. If the entity lacks
two of the remaining three corporate characteristics of perpetual existence, free
transferability of interests, and centralized management, the entity would have
been classified as a partnership under the corporate resemblance test.
325
However, because the entity failed to make an affirmative election under the
check-the-box regulations, it is taxed as a corporation. 326 In an attempt to
avoid the corporate tax on its income, the entity would have standing to
challenge the validity of the check-the-box regulations.
2. The Case of the Partner Trying to Avoid an Allocation of Ordinary
Income
If the IRS asserts a deficiency arising out of an allocation of income from a
partnership (as classified under the check-the-box regulations), the taxpayer
could avoid that allocation by showing that the partnership was really a
corporation, as corporate income does not flow through to its shareholders.
327
Thus, if the allocation came from an LLC that had all four corporate
characteristics, the taxpayer could attempt to avoid the allocation by arguing
that the check-the-box regulations were invalid. If the argument succeeds, the
LLC would be classified as a corporation under the corporate resemblance
test.
328
Although this may be a successful strategy to avoid an allocation, the
321 Id § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(B).
322 See MUNDSTOCK, supra note 213, at 10.
323 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1).
324 See id. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(B).
325 See supra text accompanying notes 191-194.
326 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2)(B).
327 Cf I.R.C. § 702(a) (requiring a partner to include his or her distributive share of the
partnership's income in his or her gross income).
328 See supra text accompanying notes 191-194.
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taxpayer would have to take into account collateral issues before undertaking
this strategy. For example, the LLC would now be considered a corporation,
and thus all of its income would be subject to the double tax regime. 29
Furthermore, if the taxpayer had previously received the benefit of flow-
through losses, they would now be lost.330 In fact, even if the flow-through
losses involved taxable years for which the statute of limitations had run, the
IRS might be able to reverse the taxpayer's tax benefits resulting from those
losses under "the uncertain and confusing judicial doctrines of equitable
estoppel and recoupment" 331 because of the taxpayer's inconsistent positions
taken with regard to the LLC's classification (first as a partnership, then as a
corporation). In short, arguing that the regulations are invalid in order to avoid
an allocation of income would not be wise in most cases because the taxpayer
would essentially win the battle (by avoiding the allocation of income) but lose
the war (by implicating these collateral concerns).
One could, however, envision a scenario where these collateral concerns are
absent or minimal. For example, assume that on January 1, 2000, Taxpayer
acquires a 50% membership interest in an LLC, a partnership under the check-
the-box regulations but a corporation under the corporate resemblance test.
Taxpayer acquires his interest for $1,000,000. In 2000, the LLC earns
$10,000,000 of income and reinvests the income, rather than distributing it.
On January 2, 2001, Taxpayer sells his 50% interest to a third party for
$6,000,000.
Under the check-the-box regulations, Taxpayer would have ordinary income
(taxed at a maximum rate of 35%332) on the $5,000,000 allocation of ordinary
income to him from the partnership. 333 Because Taxpayer's basis in his
partnership interest would be adjusted to reflect this allocation, 334 no additional
tax would be due in 2001 when he sells his interest. 335
329 See supra text accompanying notes 147-150 (explaining how corporation income is
generally taxed twice, once at the corporate level and once at the shareholder level).
330 Cf I.R.C. § 702(a) (allowing a partner to include his or her distributive share of the
partnership's losses on his or her individual income tax return).
I" BIrrKER ET AL., supra note 315, 49.10, at 49-27.
332 See I.R.C. § l(a)-(d) (setting tax rates for individuals).
333 See I.R.C. §§ 702(a), 704(a) (requiring partners to include distributive share of
partnership income in gross income and providing that in general partner's distributive share
shall be determined by the agreement of the partners).
114 See I.R.C. § 705(a)(1)(A) (providing that partner's basis in partnership interest is
adjusted upwards to reflect partner's distributive share of partnership income).
335 Taxpayer's initial basis in his partnership interest is its cost of $1,000,000. See I.R.C.
§ 1012 (explaining that the basis of property is the cost of that property). Section 705(a)
requires that this basis is adjusted upward to reflect the $5,000,000 of income allocated to
Taxpayer. Accordingly, at the time of sale, Taxpayer's basis is $6,000,000. Consequently,
when Taxpayer sells the interest for $6,000,000, he has no gain or loss. See I.R.C. § 1001(a)
(computing gain or loss on sale as the difference between the amount realized and basis); id.
§ 1001(b) (defining amount realized as amount of money plus the fair market value of
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However, under Morrissey, Taxpayer would have no tax liability in 2000
because the LLC would be classified as a corporation. 336 In 2001, when
Taxpayer sells his "stock," he would recognize a long-term capital gain (taxed
at a maximum rate of 15%) of $5,000,000. 3 3 7 Therefore, by arguing that the
check-the-box regulations are invalid, Taxpayer could save up to $1,000,000
by effectively converting ordinary income into a long-term capital gain.338
3. The Case of the Corporate Purchaser Attempting to Preserve Losses
The last example involves a corporate purchaser of an LLC, which is
classified as a partnership under the check-the-box regulations but would have
been classified as a corporation under the corporate resemblance test, that had
incurred significant losses prior to the purchase. Under a partnership
classification, the LLC's losses would have flowed through to the prior owners
to be reported on their prior returns 339  Alternatively, under a corporate
classification, the losses would be carried forward by the LLC for future use.
340
Therefore, the purchaser might argue that the check-the-box regulations were
invalid in order to preserve these losses for future use.
Under this argument, the LLC would be considered a wholly owned
subsidiary of the corporate purchaser; as a result, the corporate purchaser
would either be able to consolidate its tax returns with the LLC341 or be
property received).
336 Cf 1.R.C. § 702(a) (requiring partner to include distributive share of partnership
income in gross income).
337 See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (computing gain or loss on sale as the difference between the
amount realized and basis); id. § 1001(b) (defining amount realized as amount of money
plus the fair market value of property received). Taxpayer's basis in the stock is
$1,000,000. See I.R.C. § 1012 (explaining that the basis of property is the cost of that
property). His amount realized on the sale is $6,000,000. See I.R.C. § 1001(b) (defining
amount realized as amount of money plus the fair market value of property received). As a
result, he has a $5,000,000 gain on the sale. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (computing gain or loss on
sale as the difference between the amount realized and basis). Since the stock is a capital
asset, see I.R.C. § 1221(a), that has been held for more than a year, the gain is classified as a
long-term capital gain. See I.R.C. § 1222(3) (defining "long-term capital gain" as a "gain
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year"). Therefore, the gain
is taxed at a maximum rate of 15%. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (setting maximum capital gain rates).
338 Assuming that all income is taxed at the maximum rate, Taxpayer would owe tax of
$1,750,000 (35% of $5,000,000) if the LLC is considered a partnership and tax of $750,000
(15% of $5,000,000) if the LLC is considered a corporation.
339 See I.R.C. § 702(a) (requiring partners to include their distributive shares of
partnership losses on their individual tax returns); I.R.C. § 703(a)(2)(D) (precluding a
partnership from taking deductions for net operating losses).
340 See I.R.C. § 172(a) (allowing a deduction for net operating losses).
341 See I.R.C. § 1501 (allowing an "affiliated group of corporations" to file consolidated
returns); I.R.C. § 1504(a) (defining the term "affiliated group of corporations" to include a
parent and a wholly owned subsidiary).
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eligible for the dividends-received deduction with regard to distributions from
the LLC.34 2  Therefore, the corporate purchaser will suffer no adverse
consequences from reclassifying the LLC as a corporation by arguing that the
check-the-box regulations are invalid.
In summary, one can conceive of many situations in which a taxpayer would
benefit from transmuting his partnership interest into an interest in a
corporation by arguing that the check-the-box regulations are invalid.
Therefore, if the Treasury knowingly promulgated these invalid regulations
because it determined that no one would ever have standing to challenge the
regulations, it was mistaken. It would appear to be only a matter of time
before the right taxpayer with the right facts will challenge the validity of the
regulations. 343
Finding the true explanation for the Treasury's decision to promulgate these
invalid regulations involves some speculation. The explanation probably lies
somewhere between the two extremes. The Treasury might have believed that
the regulations were at least arguably valid, while recognizing that a court
would strive hard to find them valid. Furthermore, the Treasury was possibly
comforted by the mistaken belief that no taxpayer would ever have standing to
challenge the regulations.
V. TREASURY'S TREND
When faced with a Supreme Court interpretation of an ambiguous statutory
term in the Code that it wants changed, the Treasury has three options. First, it
could propose legislation to Congress to amend the underlying statute.
Second, it could promulgate regulations that purport to change the
interpretation in a taxpayer-adverse manner. Third, it could promulgate
regulations that purport to change the interpretation in a taxpayer-friendly
manner. This article has shown that only the first solution-go to Congress-is
valid.344 Despite this reality, however, the Treasury has shown a recent
tendency to choose the third solution-attempting to change the interpretation
in a taxpayer-friendly manner.
The check-the-box regulations, the subject of this article, represent one
example of this trend. Another example is the Treasury's recent promulgation
of regulations regarding the important issue of whether an expense can be
immediately deducted or must be capitalized. 345 Like the check-the-box
regulations, these regulations are generally taxpayer-friendly 346 (although not
342 See I.R.C. § 243(a), (b) (allowing a parent of a wholly owned subsidiary a 100%
dividends received deduction with respect to dividend distributions from subsidiary to
parent).
343 See 1 MCKEEETAL., supra note 1, at 3.08 n.421.
34 See supra Part I.D.
141 See Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 69 Fed. Reg.
436 (Jan. 5, 2004) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
346 See Calvin H. Johnson, Destroying Tax Base: The Proposed INDOPCO
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in every single case 347) and have been extensively praised by private
practitioners.348 Like the check-the-box regulations, these regulations are also
inconsistent with a Supreme Court decision, INDOPCO v. Commissioner,349
that is directly on point.350 Accordingly, these regulations are invalid to the
extent they are inconsistent with INDOPCO.
Yet another example involves the tax treatment of expenses for auditing and
training sessions paid by members of the Church of Scientology. In 1993, the
IRS issued Revenue Ruling 93-73, which allowed Church of Scientology
members to deduct these expenses as charitable contributions.35' Like the
check-the-box regulations, this Revenue Ruling was taxpayer-friendly because
the ruling allowed deductions for expenses that were otherwise non-
deductible. 352  The ruling is also, like the check-the-box regulations,
inconsistent with a Supreme Court decision, Hernandez v. Commissioner, that
is directly on point. 353 As a result, this Revenue Ruling is invalid.
Capitalization Regulations, 99 TAX NoTEs 1381, 1382 (June 2, 2003), available at LEXIS
99 TN 1381 (explaining that the regulations make it easier for a taxpayer to deduct a cost
instead of capitalizing it).
341 In general, time value of money principles dictate that, all else being equal, the
taxpayer prefers an earlier deduction to a later deduction. See generally Lawrence Lokken,
The Time Value of Money Rules, 42 TAX L. REv. 1, 20 (1986). Consequently, the
regulations are generally taxpayer-friendly in that they make it easier for a taxpayer to
deduct rather than capitalize a cost. See Johnson, supra note 346, at 1382 (stating that the
regulations allow taxpayers to deduct costs that would otherwise need to be capitalized). In
certain instances, however, a taxpayer might prefer to delay a deduction, notwithstanding
time value of money concerns. For instance, if the taxpayer will in the future be in a higher
tax rate bracket, delaying a deduction until such future time will be beneficial to the
taxpayer if the benefit of the tax rate differential exceeds the time value of money cost of
delaying the deduction. In such a case, the regulations would be taxpayer-adverse.
348 See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, Report on Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on Deduction & Capitalization of Expenditures Relating to Intangibles, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Mar. 26, 2003, available at LEXIS 2003 TNT 58-18; see also Cheyafina L.
Jaffke, Sleeping with the Enemy? The IRS' Advanced Notice of Rulemaking Regarding
Capitalization, 32 BALTIMORE L. REv. 51, 64 (2002) (describing "the widespread support
for the regulation" among taxpayers).
349 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
350 See Johnson, supra note 346, at 1386 (stating that the regulations are inconsistent
with INDOPCO).
351 See also Sklar v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 610, 614 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the IRS's
private agreement with the Church of Scientology to allow these deductions, which resulted
in the issuance of Rev. Rul. 93-73).
352 Rev. Rul. 93-73, 1993-2 C.B. 75. Unlike the check-the-box regulations and the
capitalization regulations, it is likely that no taxpayer may possibly have standing to
challenge Revenue Ruling 93-73 except perhaps on First Amendment grounds. See
BITTKER ET AL., supra note 315, § 49.10 (suggesting that "it is highly unlikely.., that
anyone would have standing to challenge [the ruling]").
353 490 U.S 680, 690-91 (1989) (concluding that Church of Scientology members may
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It is likely that the restrictive taxpayer standing doctrine plays a role in the
Treasury's issuance of these invalid rules. It is not unreasonable to assume
that if the Treasury chose to fix problematic Supreme Court interpretations by
issuing rules that were taxpayer-adverse, taxpayers would be rushing to the
courthouse to challenge the validity of these rules. For instance, if instead of
issuing the check-the-box regulations, the Treasury had attempted to cure the
quagmire created by the corporate resemblance test by issuing a regulation that
made limited liability the sole criterion for association status, many challenges
would quickly have ensued.
What does all of this mean for the Treasury? With regard to the check-the-
box regulations, the Treasury should propose "check-the-box" legislation to
Congress or legislation that would specifically authorize the Treasury to create
an elective classification regime. Likewise, the Treasury should withdraw the
invalid capitalization regulations and seek legislative action instead.
More generally, the Treasury should recognize that Supreme Court
interpretations are binding on the executive branch and that any change to such
an interpretation always, without exception, requires legislative action.
Furthermore, the Treasury should appreciate that, although it might be difficult
to find taxpayers who have standing to challenge taxpayer-friendly rules, it is
almost inevitable that they do exist.
CONCLUSION
After approximately eighty years of seemingly endless classification battles
with taxpayers, the Treasury finally capitulated by promulgating the check-the-
box regulations. These fundamental regulations, which have been extensively
praised by taxpayers, allow nonpublicly traded, unincorporated business
entities to elect their classification for tax purposes. As a result, the regulations
appear to relegate the Morrissey corporate resemblance standard to a historical
footnote. Unfortunately, while discarding this standard may well represent a
wise policy choice, the choice was not the Treasury's to make.
Had the regulations been issued on a clean slate, it is arguable that they
would have satisfied the deferential Chevron two step test and been upheld.
Nonetheless, the trilogy of Supreme Court cases underlying the incorporation
rule makes clear that the executive branch cannot simply discard a Supreme
Court interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term and insert a Mead-
qualified interpretation in its stead. Rather, the executive branch is inexorably
bound by the Court's interpretation until Congress amends the underlying
not deduct expenses for auditing and training sessions); see also Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey
H. Kahn, "Gifts, Gafts and Gefts "-The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private
and Charitable "Gifts " and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from
Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441, 506-509 (discussing Hernandez and Rev. Rul. 93-73
and maintaining that the "current tax law is in the awkward posture of the Service having
effectively repudiated its own victory in obtaining a Supreme Court ruling and instead
allowing deductions for what the Supreme Court held to be [non-deductible]").
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statute or the Court takes the highly unusual step of overruling its statutory
interpretation precedent. Since Congress has not amended the underlying
statute, and because it is unlikely that the Court would overrule Morrissey in
light of Congress's ratification of the decision through its enactment of § 7704,
the Treasury's promulgation of the check-the-box regulations was unlawful.
These invalid regulations are but one example of the Treasury's recent trend
of overlooking Supreme Court decisions directly on point in the process of
issuing taxpayer-friendly rules. The impetus behind this trend likely involves a
potent combination of the Treasury's ignorance of administrative law
principles and the restrictive taxpayer standing doctrine governing taxpayer
lawsuits. Despite the restrictive standing doctrine, it is inevitable that there
exist taxpayers who will have both standing to challenge these rules and a
significant financial incentive to make such a challenge. Upon such a
challenge, these rules, which have been commonly assumed by scholars,
practitioners, and commentators to be valid, will likely be declared invalid.
